The effect of protection upon the behaviour and performance of firms by Campbell, Neil Alexander
THE EFFECT OF PROTECTION UPON THE BEHAVIOUR 
AND PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS
Neil Alexander Campbell 
May 1996
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National 
University.
The analysis in Chapter 3 was jointly devised by myself 
and my supervisor, Dr Neil Vousden. The remaining 




I wish to express my thanks to my supervisor, Dr Neil 
Vousden, for invaluable assistance rendered throughout 
the writing of this thesis; also to Dr Rod Falvey, Dr 
David Kelsey, Dr Paul Sheard and Dr Peter Forsyth for
assistance at certain times.
Abstract
This thesis examines the idea that removing protection can improve the 
performance of the formerly protected industry. Using a principal-agent 
framework it is shown that a reduction in protection can, under certain 
circumstances, cause managerial effort to be increased and that this 
increase in effort can be seen as a welfare improvement. A simple 
decision-theoretic model is used to show that it is possible for an 
investment in a cost-reducing technology to be rejected while the 
protection is in place but then accepted once the protection is removed. 
The issue of whether a reduction in protection on intermediate goods can 
affect product quality is analysed using a Nash bargaining model. 
Plausible cases are shown where a protection reduction results in 
improved product quality. A Nash bargaining model is also used to 
analyse the relationship between the protected firm and its unionized 
workforce. It is shown that the easing of an import quota can result in 
the union agreeing to the elimination of some restrictive work practices. 
Both Spence-Dixit and Milgrom and Roberts type models are used to 
show that changes in protection can affect a domestic incumbent’s 
choice as to whether to deter or accommodate entry.
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1CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION
It is a well known result from international trade theory that protectionist policies 
have welfare costs associated with them. Protection is shown to be costly because it 
causes resources to be allocated so that the potential gains from trade are not fully 
exploited. This is a powerful argument against governments engaging in protectionist 
policies. At a popular level this argument has to share the limelight with the argument 
that protection is bad because industries receiving protection will perform less well than 
if they faced the competitive pressure associated with free trade. This argument 
characterizes the poorly performing protected firm as having; lazy managers, unions that 
insist on restrictive work practices, outdated technology, and a tendency to produce low 
quality products. The implication of this argument is that a benefit of trade liberalization 
is improved performance by the previously protected firms (an effect which can be 
labelled ‘a cold shower’). The problem with sustaining such a position is the need to 
provide an explanation for why the removal of protection should act as an incentive to 
improve certain aspects of a firm’s performance.
As economists we face the question of what to make of the cold shower 
argument. One option is simply to dismiss it as a piece of ad hoc populism. However 
this option has been made unacceptable by the significant empirical support for cold 
showers accompanying reductions in protection. For a survey of the empirical literature 
on the relationship between protection and technical efficiency see Chapter 2, Section 
VII. The contention that reduced protection can induce a firm to somehow improve its 
technical efficiency deserves serious attention. The analysis of this question by Corden
2(1974) serves as a useful illustration of how economists can contribute to understanding 
the cold shower issue. Corden simply borrows the standard theory of the individual 
worker’s labour-leisure choice and applies it to a utility-maximising entrepreneur who 
has to choose how much cost-reducing effort to supply. If the income effect toward 
leisure is sufficiently strong, a reduction in protection will increase the supply of cost- 
reducing effort. Here we have a cold shower explanation which is methodologically 
sound since it involves the decision maker acting to maximise a quite uncontroversial 
objective function. Contrast this with the following approach: ‘If protection is reduced 
then the owner/manager may put more effort into reducing costs so as to continue 
making an acceptable level of profit’. This approach abandons the basic methodological 
tenet that an economic agent acts to maximise some objective. It can not be rescued by 
devising an objective which if maximised would give the desired cold shower story. For 
instance, it could be assumed that there is some target level of income below which 
utility falls to a very low level. Such an analysis would fall into the trap of being a 
tautology which assumes what it purports to ‘prove’.
Chapters 3 to 7 contain a variety of models of protected firms in different 
situations. In all cases the objective is to analyse the effects of the removal of 
protection. The decision makers; that is, the owners, the owner/managers and the 
managers, all act to maximise profit or utility. Where utility is maximised the arguments 
contained within the utility function are quite uncontroversial. In no cases is it claimed 
that the models have universal applicability. It is simply intended to look at a variety of 
situations, all of which can be characterised as reasonably plausible.
In Chapter 3 the issue of protection and managerial effort is considered using a 
standard principal-agent framework. The protected firm has a profit-maximising owner
3who employs a manager to run the firm The manager is a utility-maximiser with a utility 
function consisting of income less the disutility of effort. The owner is unable to observe 
the manager’s level of effort and productivity type. If certain restrictions are placed 
upon the firm’s technology then a decrease in protection will cause managerial effort to 
increase. Clearly this model is particularly applicable to large corporations since in 
general there is a substantial separation between ownership and control within such 
firms. It is worth noting that the firm would not be judged by the capital market as 
failing to make the most profitable use of its assets. Profits are being maximised given 
the existence of the asymmetry of information between the owner and the manager. The 
most striking result which emerges from Chapter 3 is that given certain conditions a 
protection-induced reduction in effort will represent an additional welfare cost of 
protection.
Chapter 4 considers the case of a firm which faces the decision as to whether to 
invest in a cost-reducing technology with an uncertain return. This decision is made by 
the firm’s utility-maximising owner/manager whose utility is a function of his/her lifetime 
discounted income stream. It is shown that it is possible for the investment to be 
rejected while the protection is in place but then accepted once the protection is 
removed. The idea is that once the protection is removed the owner/manager must 
undertake the risky strategy of making the investment in order to stand any chance of 
staying in the industry. Leaving the industry involves a considerable sacrifice in 
anticipated future income since the owner/manager loses his/her industry specific human 
capital. Hence this chapter sits very comfortably with the folklore notion of trade 
liberalization putting firms under competitive pressure so that they are forced to lower 
their operating costs.
4Chapter 5 examines how a change to the level of protection on intermediate 
goods can affect the level of product quality. A Nash bargaining model is used to 
consider the removal of protection from a component supplier which gives the 
downstream firm greater bargaining power since the option of turning to a foreign 
component supplier becomes more viable. This examination of protection and product 
quality is a departure from the cold shower literature which has focused upon the cost 
of producing a given good. Similarly the literature on the economics of innovation has 
focused upon cost-reducing innovations rather than product improving innovations (see 
Tirole, 1988, Chapter 10). In the introduction to Chapter 5, some other studies which 
have touched on protection and product quality are discussed. Unlike the analysis in 
Chapter 5 these studies focus upon imperfect competition in the output market.
Chapter 6 looks at the issue of whether it is likely that trade liberalization will 
result in reforms to restrictive work practices. It is widely believed that when industries 
are protected and/or regulated a substantial amount of the rents frequently go to 
unionized labour in the form of restrictive work practices as well as higher wages. If 
trade liberalization does lead to reforms to restrictive work practices then this is another 
reason why we might expect to observe an improvement in technical efficiency being 
associated with a reduction in protection. To analyse the relationship between the firm 
and the union, a Nash bargaining framework is used. In the standard union bargaining 
model wages and employment are the two variables which the firm and the union take 
into account when engaging in negotiations. However a relatively new literature has 
emerged which also includes an effort variable. In this context the term ‘effort’ refers 
to observable work practices rather than the unobserved actions which the term ‘effort’ 
is used for in the principal-agent literature.
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Chapter 7 examines how a change in protection affects an incumbent firm’s 
choice between deterring or accommodating a potential entrant. Unlike earlier chapters 
the incumbent domestic monopolist has no way of lowering its costs in response to a 
reduction in protection. In this chapter a reduction in protection may facilitate the entry 
of a firm with lower costs. Consideration is given to the case where the entrant is a 
foreign firm as well as the case where the entrant is a domestic firm. Two frameworks 
are utilized. The first framework involves the incumbent committing to a post-entry 
level of output by investing in productive capacity. The second framework is based on 
the assumption that the potential entrant has incomplete information as to the 
incumbent’s cost.
6CH APTER 2: A LITERATURE REVIEW
I: Introduction
The idea that uncompetitive market structures result in technical inefficiency has 
received support from a number of eminent economists including such luminaries as 
Smith (1776, p.165) and Hicks (1935, p.8). The closely related proposition that a firm 
will respond to reduced protection by improving technical efficiency has received 
support from Lipsey (1960, p.512). However this support for the proposition has come 
primarily in the form of casual comments. More formal theoretical approaches give 
support of a far more circumspect nature. In almost all cases a model which can be used 
to show protection removal encourages technical efficiency can also be used to show the 
opposite case where technical efficiency is actually discouraged.
This chapter is arranged as follows. Section II outlines the cold shower effect 
and summarizes the X-efficiency debate. This literature, essentially from the 1960s and 
1970s, focuses on firms which are benefiting from either border protection or monopoly 
power. As a theoretical basis for claiming there is an X-inefficiency cost associated with 
protection it is fundamentally flawed. Section III turns to the literature based on the 
principal-agent model of the firm. Using this paradigm it becomes possible to talk about 
managerial effort deviating from its efficient, that is the full information, level. Section 
IV outlines an analysis of how domestic oligopolistic considerations can result in 
protection reduction inducing technical efficiency. Section V examines some work on 
how trade policy may affect research and development. Section VI discusses
7explanations for a protection - technical efficiency link which are based upon the 
protected firm’s actions being able to affect the level of protection it receives. Lastly 
Section VII considers empirical studies. While there are inherent difficulties associated 
with this research, significant support is found for the hypothesis that protection induces 
technical inefficiency.
II: Cold Showers and the X-Efficiencv Debate
I
The term ‘cold shower’ dates back at least to the debate in the 1960s over 
whether Britain should join the then European Economic Community (Corden, 1974, 
p.227). At a popular level the argument simply is that reducing protection increases 
competitive pressure forcing firms to act in a more technically efficient manner. Clearly 
it is implicitly being assumed here that the protected firm is not acting as a profit 
maximiser. This point has been made formally by Rodrik (1990). Here imports are 
subject to a quota so as to protect a single domestic firm. The domestic firm’s constant 
marginal cost c is assumed initially to be higher than the foreign firms’ constant marginal 
cost c*. By investing in technological effort, c can be reduced to c* over time. The 
speed at which this cost reduction takes place depends upon the expenditure made on 
technological effort. The size of this expenditure is decided so as to maximise profit. 
That is the marginal cost of technological effort is set equal to the discounted sum of its 
benefits over the period of time taken for c to fall to c*. This condition can be used to 
show that allowing an increased number of imports (reducing protection) will result in 
less being spent on technological effort. This result is hardly surprising. The benefit of 
an investment which reduces the cost of producing a unit of output will depend upon
8how many units of output are produced. Since a decrease in protection reduces the 
domestic firm’s sales, the profit maximising investment in technological effort will be 
reduced.
Commenting on the possibility of a cold shower effect, Lipsey (1960, p.512) 
states that protected firms
“....may not be adopting methods known to be technically more efficient than 
those now in use due to inertia, a dislike of risk-taking, a willingness to be 
content with moderate profits, or a whole host of other reasons.”
The idea of being content with moderate profits lies at the centre of Leibenstein’s X- 
efficiency idea. Leibenstein (1966) considers the issue of monopoly however, in general, 
protection also makes it possible for firms to deviate from profit maximisation without 
breaking the solvency constraint. Essentially what Leibenstein argues is that, without 
the pressure of a competitive market structure, firms will operate so that the cost of 
producing a unit of output is higher than the technically efficient cost level. Leibenstein 
concludes that the really significant cost of monopoly is the deviation from technical 
efficiency resulting in more resources being used to produce each unit of output. The 
label of X-inefficiency is used to distinguish this from the conventional allocative 
inefficiency stemming from the monopoly under-producing output.
Following strong criticism by a number of authors, it now seems fairly clear that 
Leibenstein’s X-efficiency argument suffers from flawed logic1. The best known and 
probably the most lucid criticism of X-efficiency comes from Stigler (1976). The
l . For a survey of the X-efficiency critics see Frantz (1988).
9Leibenstein entrepreneur can be thought of as acting to maximise outputs for given 
inputs (excluding managerial effort). The lower the manager’s ‘motivation’ the lower 
is the efficiency with which the manager acts to maximise output and hence for a given 
output the more inputs are used. Now contrast this story with the conventional 
approach to understanding the behaviour of individual agents. The entrepreneur 
maximises utility2. In this utility function, profits represent a positive argument and 
managerial effort represents a negative argument. Suppose that a change in relative 
prices causes the entrepreneur to choose to put in less effort. A reduced effort level 
implies that for a given output more inputs are required as long as effort is not included 
as an input. However once it is recognised that effort represents another input, a 
decision to reduce effort can not be seen as a reduction in efficiency with an associated 
social cost. It is because of this point that the title of Stigler’s article is "The Xistence 
of X-Efficiency". Essentially Stigler dismisses X-efficiency as being a useless concept. 
If some factor such as income tax causes the entrepreneur to make a distorted effort 
choice then this is an allocative inefficiency.
At the heart of the objections to Leibenstein is that the behaviour of the 
entrepreneur is not satisfactorily explained. All that we are really given is the assertion 
that the entrepreneur will behave in a particular way when positive economic profits 
become possible. To be able to consider whether we can, at least loosely, talk about X- 
inefficiency providing us with a rationale for the occurrence of a cold shower, it is 
necessary to consider under what circumstances a utility-maximising entrepreneur will 
increase effort in response to a reduction in protection. This insight is due to Corden
2. Modelling the entrepreneur or manager as a utility rather than a profit maximiser is a tradition which 
goes back to Scitovsky (1943).
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(1970, 1974) and is treated in somewhat more formal terms by Martin (1978). Corden 
considers the case where increased managerial effort reduces the firm’s costs. The 
justification is that at a given point in time it requires effort to search for the best 
methods of production which are available. The two arguments in the managerial utility 
function are leisure and profit. Increased leisure is regarded as being synonymous with 
reduced effort. Indeed, using an algebraic approach it is analytically convenient to 
directly include effort as a ‘bad’ in the utility function. A reduction in protection reduces 
the entrepreneur’s real income. The entrepreneur will only put in more effort if the 
supply of managerial effort curve is negatively sloped over the relevant range. The 
important point is that there is no particular reason to believe that this is the typical case. 
If the substitution effect outweighs the income effect from a protection reduction then 
the supply curve for managerial effort will be positively sloped and so cutting protection 
will actually reduce managerial effort. An additional point is the general equilibrium 
consideration that, if a cut in protection does result in a cold shower in the importables 
sector, then the increase in real incomes in the exportable sector may result in a ‘warm 
sun effect’. That is the supply of managerial effort curve in the exportables sector may 
also be negatively sloped resulting in lower effort being supplied in this sector.
In the light of the anti-X-efficiency literature the question arises as to what the 
welfare implications are of protection-induced changes to managerial effort. Vousden 
(1993) uses a general equilibrium framework to derive an expression for the welfare 
effect of a tariff which consists of a constant-effort component and a component 
attributable to changes in effort levels in both the importables and exportables sector. 
When the above components are combined we get the deadweight loss associated with 
the tariff. Thus, provided the correct compensated import demand curve is used, the
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X-efficiency welfare effect is fully accounted for within the standard measure of welfare 
loss. This analysis supports Stigler’s intuition which rejects the idea that X-efficiency 
can be thought of as something separate from allocative efficiency. The correct demand 
curve is an import demand curve estimated on the basis of, say, different tariff levels, 
rather than different observed world prices. The reason why a world price change and 
an equivalent tariff change can not be regarded as synonymous is that the model used 
takes into account that tariff revenue is recycled, affecting the size of the income effect.
A particularly important insight that comes from this analysis is that if protection 
does reduce managerial effort then this type of X-inefficiency effect will actually mitigate 
the overall welfare cost of protection. This is because protecting an industry causes it 
to produce ‘too much’ output. With an X-inefficiency effect this increase in output is 
smaller than would be the case if managerial effort stayed constant. So to be able to say 
that an X-inefficiency effect adds to the cost of protection there must be some additional 
factor that is not included in a straightforward labour-leisure choice type model. An 
example of where an X-inefficiency effect does yield an additional cost of protection is 
Vousden (1991) where a subsidy is determined by a policy maker operating without full 
information3.
Ill: Competition and Managerial Slack: Asymmetric Information within the
Firm
A stream of literature closely related to the X-efficiency debate deals with the
3. This paper is discussed further in Section VI.
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Separation of ownership and control. In this literature a fundamental question to ask is 
does a competitive market structure, as opposed to a monopolistic market structure, 
result in a higher level of managerial effort. The older managerial theory of the firm 
literature suggests that this would be the case. The more recent principal-agent 
literature indicates that it is actually very difficult to give a definite answer to this 
seemingly simple question.
The label ‘managerial theory of the firm’ is used to refer to the idea that, as long 
as a minimal level of profit is achieved, managers are free to pursue their own goals. For 
example Baumöl (1958) examines the case where the manager maximises revenue 
subject to a minimum profit constraint. If this minimum profit is zero, the manager is 
only constrained to act in a profit-maximising manner if the market structure is perfectly 
competitive (with every firm having a homogenous cost structure). Thus the general 
conclusion which comes through from this literature is that, only if the market structure 
is non-competitive (so that positive profits can be made) is it possible for managers to 
engage in non-profit-maximising behaviour (see Williamson, 1974). It follows from this 
reasoning that if one of the managerial objectives is to minimise effort, effort will only 
fall below somekind of maximal level if the product market is not perfectly competitive.
The managerial theory of the firm literature does not give any explicit treatment 
of the relationship between owners and managers. Implicitly the owner is treated as 
being virtually without any information at all to monitor the manager’s performance. 
This may be an appropriate treatment for very small individual shareholders however it 
hardly seems reasonable when large institutional shareholders are considered. The 
informational and contractual relationship between an owner and a manager lies at the 
heart of the principal-agent literature on managerial slack. In this literature the owner
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(the principal) cannot directly observe the manager’s (the agent’s) effort but does have 
sufficient other information to set a contract so that the manager will put in the profit- 
maximising effort, given the information asymmetry. A number of relatively recent 
papers use this framework to address the question of whether a competitive market 
structure encourages more managerial effort than a monopolistic one.
Hart (1983) analyzes a case in which the competitive price mechanism limits the 
opportunities for managerial slack to occur. Suppose that there are two types of firms 
within an industry; entrepreneurial and managerial. The entrepreneurial firms are 
conventional profit-maximisers. The managerial firms have a profit-maximising owner 
who cannot observe the effort of a utility-maximising manager. The owner is also 
unable to observe the ‘state of the world’ that is certain (exogenous) costs faced by the 
firm In order to obtain Hart’s results it is necessary to place some strong restrictions 
upon the manager’s utility function. The manager is very averse to the possibility of not 
achieving a certain level of income I . Any income above I will not increase utility. 
That is, rather than receive any income above I , the manager would prefer to put in less 
effort. Hart shows that the optimal contract is for the owner to commit to paying the 
manager I provided that a target profit is reached. This target profit is the profit 
consistent with the highest possible cost outcome and the maximum level of managerial 
effort. Hence, if the cost outcome is below the highest possible level, the manager will 
put in effort below the maximum level.
In Hart’s model all of the firms have costs which are positively correlated. This 
allows us to say that, when costs are reduced, entrepreneurial firms will expand and 
consequently the output price falls. The reduction in costs allows the manager, in 
managerial firms, to reduce effort while still achieving the target level of profit.
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However the extent to which effort can be reduced is moderated by the reduction in the 
output price. If this managerial firm had been a monopoly then the cost reduction could 
be used entirely for increasing managerial utility by reducing effort.
This result of Hart’s supports Hicks’ (1935) intuition that monopoly provides 
‘a quiet life’. However Scharfstein (1988) shows that once the strong restrictions are 
removed from the manager’s utility function, the opposite result can emerge - ie 
competition can increase managerial slack. In Scharfstein’s model there are two states 
of the world; high productivity and low productivity. Scharfstein shows that the optimal 
incentive scheme consists of paying the manager IH if a profit of IIH is achieved (that 
being the higher productivity target profit) and paying the manager IL if a profit of IIL 
is achieved (that being the low productivity target profit). IL needs to be set sufficiently 
below IH to give the manager enough incentive, in the high productivity case, to put in 
the extra effort required to achieve IIH rather than IIL. It is shown that this incentive 
compatibility constraint results in a below-optimal level of effort, output and profit when 
productivity is low.
As with Hart, competition comes from the entrepreneurial firms. These firms do 
not have an agency problem and so operate efficiently whether productivity is high or 
low. When productivity is low an entrepreneurial firm will produce more output than 
the comparable managerial firm. Hence, the more entrepreneurial firms in the industry, 
the greater industry output and consequently the lower the output price. A lower price 
is shown to imply a lower IIL. To maintain incentive compatibility it is necessary to 
extend the difference between IH and IL, further decreasing the low productivity effort 
level below what it would be in the full information case.
McAfee and McMillan (1991) also use a principal-agent model to examine the
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effect of product market competition upon the total costs of production. Unlike the 
Hart-Scharfstein analysis the manager’s private information only consists of the 
productivity type. Also there is no assumption that type is correlated across firms. It 
is shown how the total cost of producing a given output can be divided between 
conventional production costs and the information rent which the manager receives. To 
obtain an index of technical efficiency, production cost (the full information or lowest 
possible total cost) is divided by production cost plus information rent (the actual total 
cost). They consider an increase in the price elasticity of demand for the firm’s output 
as a device for reflecting an increase in competitiveness of the market structure. 
Whether such an increase in competition increases technical efficiency depends upon the 
form which the cost function takes. The general cost function used has two arguments; 
quantity, q, and type, t, with minimal and uncontroversial restrictions (C°t^ 0, C°qt<0, 
C°q>0, C°qq^ 0). An increase in competition is synonymous with an increase in q. An 
increase in q only increases efficiency if q .C ^C 0, the elasticity of cost with respect to 
output, exceeds q .C ^C 0,, the elasticity of the rate of change in cost with respect to type. 
McAfee and McMillan conclude from this that their analysis does not give general 
support to the proposition that competition results in increased technical efficiency.
Horn, Lang, and Lundgren (1995) use an asymmetric information approach to 
examine how trade liberalization affects managerial effort. In their general equilibrium 
model the owners of firms are unable to observe either managerial effort or the firm’s 
productivity type. In response to this information asymmetry between owners and 
managers each owner offers the respective manager a contract which induces the profit- 
maximising effort level. By assuming a specific technology and Cournot competition, 
results are obtained which give some support to the cold shower proposition. A bilateral
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trade liberalization is considered by comparing effort levels under free trade and autarky. 
It is demonstrated that effort levels will be higher under free trade. A number of effects 
are identified that when taken together give this result. Firstly there is the ‘home market 
effect’. This refers to domestic firms’ decreasing output, and consequently effort, in 
response to the introduction of foreign competition. Secondly there is the ‘market 
enlargement effect’. Free trade gives the domestic firms access to the foreign market. 
The domestic firms respond by increasing output and consequently effort. Where the 
home and foreign countries are symmetric the market enlargement effect dominates the 
home market effect. Lastly the‘factor market effect’ refers to how effort will be affected 
by changes in wages induced by free trade.
IV: Protection and the Strategic Choice of Technology
Rodrik (1990) presents a protection - technical efficiency analysis which requires 
its own separate classification. The focus is on a domestic oligopoly rather than a single 
domestic firm. The problem that these firms face is that competition erodes the potential 
profits. The impact of this competition may be reduced if the firms can commit 
themselves to lower sales. One device for achieving this commitment is for the firms to 
choose outdated or costly technology. The analytical framework used is an adaption of 
the investment in capacity - entry-deterrence models4. It is shown that under certain 
conditions the higher potential profit associated with protection acts as a stronger 
inducement for firms to make a low investment in technological effort. Rodrik makes
4. For an example of this type of model see Dixit (1980).
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it clear that this result lacks generality since it is necessary to assume that the firms will 
engage in ‘excessive’ competition5. The most extreme version of this excessive 
competition concept is the Bertrand paradox where competition (or aggressive 
behaviour) reduces potential profits to zero.
V: Protection and Research and Development (R&D)
The R&D literature has traditionally been concerned with how market failure can 
result in a non-optimal level of innovative activity6. If a firm invests in R&D and 
discovers a new process or product then the rents from this invention may be 
appropriated by other firms engaging in imitation. The patent system allows the 
innovating firm to recoup its R&D costs, however in doing so, it confers monopoly 
power upon this firm. For a lucid discussion of the public good nature of R&D see 
Arrow (1962). In addition to the public good problem there is also the patent race issue. 
There is quite an extensive literature associated with this issue7. The essential idea is 
that competing firms ‘race’ to be the first to make an innovation so that there is an 
excess amount of innovative activity.
Clemenz (1990) examines how protection may influence the level of R&D using 
a two-country model. The industry consists of two firms. Firm A is the foreign firm. 
Firm B is the domestic firm. At least initially, the foreign firm has the lower marginal
5. For an overview of the literature on strategic investment see Dixit (1986).
6. For an overview of the literature on R&D see Tirole (1988 Chapter 10).
7. Dasgupta (1988) sets the concept of a patent race in context with other literature on the economics 
of innovation.
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cost; cA<cB. The only way for either of these firms to reduce their costs is to engage in 
R&D. That is, imitation and buying the licence to new technology, are assumed not to 
occur. Clemenz models R&D as making an investment which allows the firm to make 
a random draw from a probability distribution of possible marginal costs. If the drawn 
marginal cost is lower than the existing marginal cost then the new technology is 
adopted. The firm will continue to invest in R&D until the ‘reservation unit cost level’ 
is reached. This is where the cost of making the investment equals its expected return. 
Thus R&D is being treated as a ‘search process’. If there is a state of autarchy 
obviously the two firms will both be monopolists. If free trade prevails, then the two 
firms engage in Bertrand competition.
Clemenz describes the innovative process, in the context of a Bertrand duopoly, 
as a ‘winner-takes-all R&D race’. The firm with the higher cost will make zero profit. 
Clearly, at the start of such a race, the domestic firm will be the one that makes zero 
profit. However, following some R&D, the situation may be reversed. The extent to 
which the domestic firm engages in R&D depends upon how likely it is to achieve a cost 
which is lower than the foreign firm. This will be dependent upon the size of the initial 
cost gap between the domestic and foreign firms. Clemenz shows that shifting from 
autarky to free trade may stimulate or may retard R&D by the domestic firm. Shifting 
to free trade increases the combined sales of the two firms. This is shown to stimulate 
R&D in at least one country. If the initial cost gap is sufficiently small, then R&D in the 
home country will increase. With a larger initial cost gap, free trade is shown to be an 
obstacle to home country R&D. Think of it this way, suppose domestic and foreign 
costs are both reduced but the foreign firm remains the low cost firm. While this would 
result in a welfare improvement for the domestic consumers, it would not increase the
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profit of the domestic firm above zero. By way of contrast, in autarchy an identical 
reduction in cost would increase the domestic firm’s profit (gross of R&D expenditure). 
Clemenz goes on to show that a direct R&D subsidy is a more efficient instrument, than 
the imposition of autarchy, for shifting the level of R&D closer to the social optimum.
VI: Endogenous and Made-to-Measure Protection: The Implications for
Technical Efficiency
So far all the literature treats protection as something that the protected firm’s 
actions cannot affect. Such a treatment can be justified on the basis of being a useful 
simplification. Recognising that protected firms behaviour may be partly explained in 
terms of influencing the level of protection provides us with further rationalizations for 
the belief that protection adversely affects technical efficiency.
Corden (1974, p.228-229) briefly considers how a made-to-measure tariff system 
may encourage managerial slack. Suppose government policy is to reduce the tariff 
whenever increased profits occur in the previous period. Given this policy an exogenous 
rise in the price of imports may result in import-competing entrepreneurs reducing their 
effort level so as to keep profit constant. A view, based on a similar idea, is expressed 
by Bergsman (1974, p.413) in a discussion of his framework used to attempt to measure 
the ‘X-inefficiency costs’ of protection:
“Producers do not necessarily minimize costs or maximize profits, at least in the
sense of simpler economic analysis that assumes.... ,no political dangers from
driving one’s competitors out of business,....”
The footnote to this reads:
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“This.... may be especially important in LDCs, where the most efficient firms are 
often subsidiaries of foreign companies and some of the higher cost firms are 
purely local.”
Bergsman goes on to observe that it is common in Brazil for industries to be made up 
o f firms with greatly differing productivity. In general the firms with more advanced 
technology avoid taking market share from the other firms.
Tornell (1991) presents a formal model showing how made-to-measure 
protection can fail to achieve government objectives. Here, as a result of unmodelled 
political pressures, government policy is to prevent industry employment falling below 
N . The industry consists of a single domestic profit-maximising firm that faces a 
perfectly competitive international market. Without government intervention the firm 
would set employment below N . However if the firm makes a sufficient investment in 
cost-reducing technology (investment K ) it would become profit-maximising to employ 
N . The government attempts to achieve this by use of an investment-contingent 
subsidy. At time t0 the investment-contingent subsidy is granted together with the 
announcement that this subsidy will be terminated at time t,. The subsidy scheme is set 
so that the firm would choose to invest K if the firm believed that no further protection 
would be provided beyond time tv However the announcement that protection will be 
terminated at time q is not something to which the government can credibly commit. 
The firm knows that if it invests below K then following time q the firm will receive 
sufficient protection so as to insure employment of N . Consequently Tornell describes 
the government’s made-to-measure protectionist program as time-inconsistent and
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shows that the firm chooses to invest less than K 8. By reducing the investment below K 
the firm loses some benefit in terms of cost reduction and investment-contingent subsidy. 
However these losses are more than offset by the gain in the form of an increased rate 
o f protection at time q. Tomell goes on to show that for an investment-contingent 
subsidy to induce investment K it is necessary to set an ‘oversubsidization rate’ equal 
to the present value of any future protection which may be induced.
Matsuyama (1990) is another example of an analysis which shows how a policy 
o f temporary protection can fail due to being time-inconsistent. The overall message 
from Matsuyama is the same as that from Tomell. That is, temporary protection can 
prove ineffectual due to government being unable to credibly commit to the future 
removal of protection. Matsuyama’s ‘liberalization game’ has an infinite horizon with 
the two players being the government and the firm. Prior to the game starting, the firm 
is a protected domestic monopolist. Then a new government is elected. The 
government wants to remove the protection and it wants the firm to make a cost- 
reducing investment. The government has the first move in the game (at the beginning 
of period 1). The government has to choose between liberalizing (L) and not liberalizing 
(NL). If L is chosen then the foreign firm enters and that is the end of the liberalization 
game. If NL is chosen then the firm has to choose between investing (I) and not 
investing (NI). If I is chosen then at the beginning of period 2 the government chooses 
L and the foreign firm enters with the liberalization game ending here. If NI is chosen 
then the government at the beginning of period 2 has to once again choose between L
8 . Kydland and Prescott (1977) is regarded as the seminal work in the time consistency of optimal 
economic policy literature. Much of this literature is concerned with fiscal and monetary policy. For 
another example of time inconsistency problems in protection policy see Staiger and Tabellini (1987).
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and NL. If the government continually chooses NL and the firm continually chooses NI 
the game can go on for an infinite number of periods. Matsuyama argues that subgame- 
prefect Nash equilibria, which involve the policy of temporary protection achieving the 
government’s objective, should be rejected on the grounds that they fail the 
‘renegotiation-proof criteria. The idea being that the firm can always choose NI and 
negotiate another period of protection.
Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995) consider a case where initially, the foreign firm has 
adopted a new technology, while the domestic firm has not adopted this technology. 
Consequently the foreign firm has lower production costs. The cost of acquiring the 
new technology decreases over time. Miyagiwa and Ohno examine whether protection 
speeds up or delays the adoption of the technology. They first consider the case of 
where the protection is permanent (that is, where protection is exogenous with respect 
to the domestic firm’s choice as to when to adopt the new technology). They then go 
on to consider the case of conditional protection. In this case the protection is removed 
once the new technology has been adopted.
Miyagiwa and Ohno set out the domestic firm’s intertemporal profit 
maximisation problem based on the assumption that the firms engage in Cournot 
competition. They show that the first-order-condition can be arranged so that the 
marginal benefit of adopting at time t equals the marginal cost. The marginal benefit, 
or as they call it the marginal value o f technology, is the increase in momentary profits 
from adopting at t. The marginal cost of adoption refers to the marginal opportunity 
cost of adopting at t instead of at t+e. A permanent tariff increases the marginal 
valuation of the technology so that the technology is adopted at an earlier date than
would have been the case with free trade. With a permanent quota, the story is the same
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provided that the quota is binding both before and after the adoption. However, it is 
shown that, if the quota ceased to bind following the adoption, then the increase in non­
adoption momentary profit can result in the quota actually delaying the adoption. 
Turning to conditional protection, they note that if protection was sufficiently high, then 
adoption would never take place. As is to be expected, they concentrate upon the case 
where there is an internal solution. Conditional protection is shown, not surprisingly, 
to delay the adoption since once the adoption takes place the firm receives no more 
protection.
While Tomell, Matsuyama and Miyagiwa and Ohno abstract from the political 
process which determines the level of protection there is a substantial body of literature 
which treats this issue in an explicit fashion9. Here a common approach is to model the 
government as maximising a political support function. This involves setting protection 
so that the marginal benefit in terms of support from the protected industry equates with 
the marginal cost in terms of lost support from parties who are adversely affected. 
Vousden (1991) modifies this approach by dispensing with the assumption that the 
government can perfectly observe the protected firm’s cost. To do this, the principal- 
agent paradigm is used with the government being the principal and the protected 
industry, assumed to be a single firm, being the agent. This paradigm has been used 
extensively in the literature on regulatory mechanisms10. The specific version of the 
principal-agent model used by Vousden was devised by Laffont and Tirole (1986) 
working within this regulatory literature. The government can not observe the firm’s 
level of effort and is unaware of the firm’s productivity type. To maximise political
9. For an overview of the political economy of protection literature see Hillman (1989).
10. See Baron (1989) for a survey of this literature.
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support the government uses an incentive-compatible subsidy package. The package 
consists of both a conventional subsidy payed on each unit of output plus another 
component which depends upon the observed level of cost at the end of the production 
period. This latter component acts as a disincentive for the firm to pretend to be a 
higher-cost type than it is in reality. The political support - maximising subsidy package 
will imply a certain level of effort. The paper shows that, under certain conditions, the 
level of effort which such a subsidy induces is lower than the effort level which would 
be chosen in the free trade case. These (sufficient) conditions consist of the following 
extra restrictions upon the firm’s cost function:
where x is output, e is effort and 0 is productivity type. Vousden notes that these 
conditions bear some similarity to the McAfee and McMillan (1991) conditions for 
monopoly to reduce efficiency (discussed earlier). It is also noted that it is not difficult 
to devise cost functions which comply with these restrictions. As an example 
C(0, e, x) = ( 0 - e).x is cited. This is the special case used by Laffont and Tirole.
Another result from the Vousden paper is that, if lobbying by the protected firm 
increases the weight placed upon its interests by the government, then this will imply 
lower effort levels. It is a result which offers a rationale for the idea that protected firms 
put in low effort levels because managerial attention is diverted toward lobbying.
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VII: Trade Liberalization as a Cause of Improved Technical Efficiency:
Empirical Evidence
Suppose it was observed that technical inefficiency was correlated with those 
industries which received higher levels of protection. There is an obvious problem in 
ascribing causation. It might be that the protection has caused the technical inefficiency. 
However it might be that those industries which are technically inefficient lack 
comparative advantage and hence are granted protection so as to allow their survival11. 
It may aiso be the case that such industries receive higher marginal gains from lobbying 
for increases in protection. A methodology designed to overcome this problem would 
be to observe technical efficiency both before and after a change in protection. Tybout, 
de Melo and Corbo (1991) do this using Chile’s dramatic trade liberalization which 
occurred in the 1970s. This study uses industry census data, at the plant level, for 1967 
and 1979. In 1967 protection levels were very high. In addition there were substantial 
differences in the protection levels between industries. By 1979 protection levels had 
become very low and very uniform. It seems that the size of the protection reduction 
for any given industry was purely determined by the initial level of protection. Thus 
industries with particularly high levels of protection, prior to the trade liberalization, 
experienced the largest reduction in protection. Tybout et al examine whether there is 
a tendency for these industries to have had the greatest increase in technical efficiency. 
To do this, 1967 and 1979 production functions are estimated for each industry. This
11. Such a policy of made-to-measure protection is consistent with Corden’s famous conservative social
welfare function (Corden 1974 p.107-109).
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allows changes in technical efficiency to be measured independently of scale effects. 
Using Spearman rank correlations, a strong association is found between improved 
technical efficiency and reductions in protection. An interesting point made by this study 
is that over the 1970s the measured productivity growth (total factor productivity 
growth) made by Chilean industries was actually quite poor. Taking the manufacturing 
sector as a whole, there actually would appear to have been a fall in total factor 
productivity between 1967 and 1979. Tybout et al consider one reason for this to have 
been the relatively slack demand for manufactured products in 1979. They consider that 
the major macroeconomic shocks which Chile experienced could mask the effects of 
commercial policy. There was hyperinflation during 1973, a major recession in the mid- 
1970s, and during the latter half of the 1970s an exchange rate appreciation and an 
increase in the real interest rate. Other reasons cited why a fall in productivity may be 
observed include changing technology and measurement errors associated with capital 
stocks and the price deflators. Since the methodology of Tybout et al is comparative in 
nature, these problems associated with interpreting productivity growth should largely 
be abstracted from. That is, they judge that all Chilean industries have been roughly 
subject to the same macroeconomic shocks and measurement errors.
Mexico is another country which has experienced a dramatic trade liberalization. 
In 1985 there was a substantial reduction in protection. Initially the impact was lessened 
by a substantial devaluation but in 1987 an appreciation resulted in Mexican industries 
facing the full competitive pressure of the reduction in protection. Tybout and 
Westbrook (1995) use plant level data from annual surveys for 1984 to 1990 to examine 
the proposition that foreign competition had made manufacturing industries more 
technically efficient. Using similar technique to the Chilean study, productivity growth
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for each industry is decomposed into various components. These are scale effects, share 
effects and residual effects. The term ‘share effects’ refers to an industry’s productivity 
being increased as a result of the more technically efficient plants producing a greater 
share of total industry output. The term ‘residual effects’ refers to productivity growth 
which is not accounted for by either scale or share effects. Tybout and Westbrook 
describe it as a collection of hard-to-measure effects like capacity utilization, 
externalities, technical innovation, leaming-by-doing and managerial effort. A variety 
o f measures of international competition are utilised. These are; effective rates of 
protection, import licence coverage, official tariff rates, import penetration rates, and 
export shares. The results of the analysis suggest that increased exposure to 
international competition cause an increase in productivity and that this increase in 
productivity is mainly driven by the residual effects. It is found that improvements in 
scale efficiency are not associated with increased international competition. Thus both 
this and the Chilean study are consistent with the cold-shower argument.
Naturally it would be desirable to obtain evidence of this sort for more than two 
countries. Unfortunately drastic across-the-board trade liberalizations which are both 
preceded and followed by detailed industry censuses or surveys are uncommon 
occurrences. It is worth noting two purely cross-sectional studies which are consistent 
with the findings of the Chilean and Mexican studies. Carlsson (1972) uses 
establishment data for 26 Swedish manufacturing industries from 1968 for the purpose 
o f investigating for evidence that competitive pressure affects technical efficiency. 
Carlsson estimates a production function for each industry allowing him to give each 
industry an efficiency index. Altogether four measures of freedom from competitive 
pressure are considered. The four-firm concentration ratio is used as an indicator of
28
domestic market power. As Carlsson notes, the concentration ratio is a very imperfect 
indicator. It fails to take into account the effect of close substitutes. More importantly, 
in the case of a small open economy, there is the problem of the concentration ratio 
ignoring the effect of foreign competition. Three measures of foreign competition are 
considered; the nominal tariff level, the export/output ratio and the import/consumption 
ratio. The results of the regression analysis indicate that the tariff is significant in 
explaining the variation in the efficiency index. Industries that are both heavily protected 
and inefficient include breweries, dairies and textiles and apparel. The export/output 
ratio and the import/consumption ratio are found not to be significant. This is judged 
to be probably due to the industries being defined too broadly. The concentration ratio 
is actually positively correlated with the efficiency index. Carlsson explains this by 
saying in the case of a small open economy it is likely that the concentration ratio reflects 
economies of scale and specialisation rather than market power.
The other purely cross-sectional study considered is Caves and Barton (1990). 
They give a book-length treatment to efficiency in U.S. manufacturing industries. Their 
methodology for estimating efficiency is very similar to that of Carlsson. The data for 
these estimates is taken from the 1977 Annual Survey of Manufacturers. They choose 
1977 partly because it is a year when the Census of Manufactures was taken. Data from 
this census is used as a source for exogenous variables in their analysis of interindustry 
differences in technical efficiency. A large number of exogenous variables are 
considered. Caves and Barton classify these variables under the following headings; 
competitive conditions, product differentiation and heterogeneity, occurrence of change 
and innovation, geographic market heterogeneity and organisational influences. The 
variables considered with respect to competitive conditions are; the four-firm
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concentration ratio, an adjusted four-firm concentration ratio (adjusted to take into 
account various factors such as international competition), the number of indictments 
for anticompetitive agreements from 1958 to 1977, the imports/consumption ratio 
averaged from 1972 to 1976 and the export/output ratio averaged from 1972 to 1976. 
They do not consider protection because of data problems. They describe the 
econometric procedure which is followed as being “somewhat inductive”(p. 88). The 
problem which they, and any similar study, face is that there is no single neat theory of 
technical efficiency to dictate which model should be tested. Their approach involves, 
starting with the variables which have the strongest theoretic claim for being included 
and the fewest missing observations, and then following this, experimenting with the 
inclusion of some of the other variables. The results from this study are consistent with 
competitive pressure inducing technical efficiency. A positive correlation is found 
between import competition and technical efficiency in those industries with a highly 
concentrated domestic market structure. The obvious interpretation to put on this, is 
that, firms which would be fairly ‘safe’ from competition in autarchy, are subject to 
competitive pressure from imports.
One other study which is worth mentioning is a recent contribution to the 
productivity growth and technical efficiency literature by Fecher and Perelman (1992). 
This study uses a database which covers 13 OECD countries by sector from 1971 to 
1986. Using pooled data an, estimation is made for each sector’s production function. 
Technical efficiency is measured in terms of the distance between the estimated 
production frontier and the observed output. That is the technical efficiency for a 
particular sector in a given country and year is considered in terms of the difference 
between the observed output and the output which would be predicted by the production
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function estimated for that sector. Thus to say that a particular sector in a given country 
is technically inefficient is to say that it performs inefficiently in comparison with the 
sector taken as a whole across all 13 OECD countries. A number of factors which may 
explain differences in technical efficiency are tested. The explanatory effect of each 
variable is shown by country, sector and time period. Import competition is shown to 
be significant for three small countries; Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway. Export 
competition is shown to be significant for Germany, France, Norway and the US. 
However it is somewhat surprising to note that in some cases a negative relationship is 
found between import and/or export competition and technical efficiency. Overall the 
authors conclude that competition is the main determinant of technical efficiency. It is 
found that tariff and nontariff barriers are not significant. This may be due to incomplete 
data. The data does not extend to the sectoral level and only pertains to a single year 
(1980 for tariff barriers and 1983 for nontariff barriers). The variable used for tariff 
barriers is national customs and import duties divided by the values of imports. For 
nontariff barriers two variables are used; effective protection by national quantitative 
restrictions on manufacturing imports and effective protection by all national nontariff 
barriers to manufacturing imports. Finally it is worth mentioning a caveat made by the 
authors that their methodology is unsuited to detecting the lagged effect which possible 
explanatory variables may have upon technical efficiency.
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CHAPTER 3: PROTECTION AND MANAGERIAL EFFORT
REVISITED
I: Introduction
In this chapter a principal-agent model is used to provide another explanation for 
the cold shower effect1. As is to be expected the cold shower effect only occurs under 
certain conditions. It will be shown that if particular restrictions are placed upon the 
protected firm’s technology there will be a negative relationship between protection and 
managerial effort. The cold shower effect in this analysis has welfare implications which 
are not included within the standard deadweight loss associated with protection. Given 
certain conditions we can say that the occurrence of protection-induced managerial slack 
will contribute to the cost of protection. This result is quite striking when it is 
remembered that, with a model based upon a backward bending supply of effort curve, 
a decrease in managerial effort will mitigate the cost of protection since the gap between 
free trade output and protected output is lessened.
The principal-agent framework used is quite standard. In this case, the principal 
is the owner and the agent is the manager. While the owner can observe the cost of 
production, he is unable to observe the manager’s level of effort and productivity type. 
The arguments in the firm’s cost function are output, effort and productivity type. The 
restrictions placed upon this cost function are minimal and uncontroversial. This allows
1. The analysis contained in this chapter is presented in journal article form in Vousden and Campbell 
( 1994).
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identification of which restrictions are necessary for a cold shower to take place and 
have an X-inefficiency cost of protection associated with it.
In the case where a cold shower does occur this result is being driven by the 
asymmetry in information. The owner is a conventional risk-neutral profit maximiser. 
If the owner had full information then an increase in protection would, if anything, result 
in an increase in the use of managerial effort. Hence this chapter represents a distinct 
departure from the utility-maximising entrepreneur or the utility-maximising manager 
with essentially passive owners. Without full information the owner has to pay the 
manager an information rent to illicit a truthful revelation of productivity type. Hence, 
when deciding upon the profit-maximising level of effort, the owner has to take into 
account what the associated information rent will be. If protection increases, the profit- 
maximising owner responds by increasing output. With some technologies the increase 
in output increases the marginal information costs of extra effort. If this is the case, then 
it is profit-maximising for the owner to require a lower level of effort as well as a higher 
level of output. Examples of plausible technologies which will give this outcome are 
provided.
The popular preconception is that if protection induces a reduction in managerial 
effort then this must be bad for society. This analysis shows that only under certain 
conditions is it possible to talk about there being an X-inefficiency cost of protection. 
Consider the following case. Suppose that the firm’s technology is such that the levels 
of effort and output are initially below their full information levels. Now suppose further 
that the technology is such that if protection is increased then effort will be reduced. 
Here the distortion in the choice of effort caused by the information asymmetry is 
magnified. That is, the gap between the socially efficient choice of effort and the
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privately chosen effort has been made larger by the increase in protection. This is a cost 
o f protection which is in addition to the standard deadweight loss associated with 
protection.
This chapter is arranged as follows. Section II sets out the model which is used. 
It goes on to establish the conditions for the profit-maximising choice of effort and 
output given the asymmetry of information. Section III considers the comparative 
statics associated with a change in protection. Examples are shown of some 
technologies which give a cold shower result. Section IV contains the welfare analysis. 
Finally some concluding comments are made in Section V.
II: Optimal choice of Effort with Asymmetric Information
For simplicity, the domestic industry consists of a single firm selling its output 
on a competitive world market. The owner of the firm is an expected-profits maximiser. 
The firm is run by a manager who maximises expected utility. The manager’s utility 
function consists of income less the disutility of effort. The disutility of effort function 
is denoted \j/(e) where The more effort the manager puts in, the lower will
be the expected cost of production. The manager’s effort can not be observed by the 
owner and thus the setting of the effort level can be regarded as a hidden action. The 
owner is unable to deduce the effort level by observing the realized cost of production 
because of the effect of stochastic disturbances. The owner is also unable to observe 0, 
the manager’s productivity type. This can be thought of as representing either the 
manager’s inherent ability or particular circumstances which affect the firm but are 
beyond the manager’s control. Since 0 cannot be affected by the manager it needs to
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be thought of as hidden information rather than a hidden action. The owner does know 
the probability distribution of all possible productivity types; F(0). 0! is the lower limit 
o f this distribution, that is the most productive type. 02 is the upper limit, that is the 
least productive type. The expected cost of production obviously needs to be written 
as a function of productivity type and effort as well as output:
C(0,e,x), (Ce>0, Cee*0, Ce<0, C«>0, Cx>0, C„>0f C^cO)
It can be noted from this that we are assuming effort is not an inferior input since 
increasing effort reduces both total and marginal cost. The cost, which is actually 
observed by the owner after production has taken place, is subject to the conditional 
probability distribution
H(z |C(0,e,x)), H!=h>0, H2<0,
where h is the density function derived from H and H2 represents the partial derivative 
of H with respect to the mean cost C2.
This type of principal-agent problem was developed by Laffont and Tirole (1986) 
to examine government regulation of natural monopolies when the regulator can observe 
ex post cost even though effort and productivity type are unobservable. They show that 
the asymmetric effort level differs from the full information effort level. Hence this 
framework is particularly suitable for looking at the question of managerial effort within 
a profit-maximising firm. For reasons of tractability Laffont and Tirole treat both the 
principal and the agent as risk-neutral. Hence in this chapter the manager is treated as 
risk-neutral rather than risk-averse. This is desirable since here managerial risk aversion 
can be eliminated as a factor causing increased protection to result in lower managerial




This section proceeds to derive the conditions for the owner optimally choosing 
effort and output. The owner, of course, cannot simply order the manager to put in the 
required level of effort. Rather, the owner chooses the payment function T which 
induces the profit-maximising choice of e and x by the manager. This payment function 
is dependent upon the variables which the owner can observe. These are; 0* the 
productivity type the manager reports, x the level of output, and z the realized 
production cost. Prior to solving the owner’s profit maximisation problem, it is 
necessary to devise the constraints which the owner faces. The incentive compatibility 
constraint can be thought of in terms of the requirement that the manager has no 
incentive to falsely report his productivity type. Hence we require that a relatively high- 
productivity manager cannot gain an advantage from pretending to be a low-productivity 
manager in order to be able to hide a low level of effort. The reason why we require the 
incentive compatibility constraint to hold is that we are told by the Revelation Principal3 
that an incentive scheme which elicits a truthful response yields at least as high a value 
of the principal’s objective function as any other incentive scheme. To establish the 
incentive compatibility constraint we need to consider the manager’s expected utility 
maximisation problem:
u(0 ) = max I T (0 ’,x ,z )h (z  | C (0 ,e ,x ))d z  - C (0 ,e ,x )  - \{r(e) (1)
0\e,x J
z
where 0* is the value of 0 reported by the manager.
Here the manager receives a payment of T from which he must cover the production
3. See Myerson (1979).
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costs. The actual value of the payment is stochastic since the observed cost z is a 
affected by a random disturbance. For a given payment function the manager’s choice 
of effort will satisfy
Cc[ |T h 2dz- 1 ] -  i|/'(e) = 0. (2)
z
It is convenient to rewrite this as
f T h d z - U - ^ .  (2a){ C ‘
Let us now consider the incentive compatibility constraint. For this to hold we must 
have 0*=0. If this is the case, then, using the envelope theorem:
u'(0) = T (e\x ,z)h(z  I C(0,e,x))dz - C(0,e ,x) - f  (e)]
C0[jT h2dz- 1] . (3)
The interpretation which can be placed upon this condition is that any gain to the 
manager from misrepresenting his productivity type will be offset by the effect upon the 
incentive payment T. The more productive managers need to receive a higher payment 
so as to deter them from understating their productivity type in order to obtain a larger 
cost reimbursement. Using (2a) the incentive compatible condition can be written as
C 0
u'(0) = where y = — < 0 .  (4)
C e
From this it is clear that u'(0)<O. That is as 0 increases (as the manager’s type becomes 
less productive) the manager’s utility decreases. So it can be said that the high 
productivity manager will receive a higher information rent so as to insure that 0 is
correctly reported.
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The other constraint which the owner faces is the participation constraint. That 
is, the owner must offer the manager a contract which is at least as attractive as the 
manager’s next best alternative. The manager’s reservation utility is assumed to be zero. 
Hence the participation constraint is u(0)^O. What this is saying is that, whatever the 
manager’s type, his expected utility must be non-negative. From the incentive 
compatibility constraint, it is clear that the least productive type of manager will have the 
lowest level of utility. Consequently if the incentive scheme is such that the least 
productive manager would expect to obtain non-negative utility then the participation 
constraint would be satisfied since all other types of managers would receive positive 
utility (an information rent). So the participation constraint may be written as
U(02) i  0 . (5)
We are now in a position to formulate the owner’s profit maximisation problem. 
It is convenient to write the owner’s expected cost (the payment to the manager) in 
terms of covering the manager’s production costs, providing the manager with an 
information rent and compensating the manager for the disutility of effort:
jT (0 ,x ,z )h (z  |C(0 ,e ,x))dz-  C (0 ,e ,x ) .  u(0) ♦ >|r(e) •
Z
Hence we can write the owner’s expected profit as
Eft (0) = (p*+ s)x - C(0 ,e,x) - u(0) - i|/(e) , 
where p* is the given world price for output and s is a per unit production subsidy 
financed by lump sum taxes. It is analytically convenient to state the owner’s problem 
in terms of choosing x(0), e(0), u(0t) and u(02) to maximise 
e2 e2




subject to the incentive compatibility and participation constraints (4) and (5) where f(0) 
(=F'(0)) denotes the owner’s probability density function for 0. This is a ffee-end point, 
optimal-control problem with control variables e(0) and x(0) and state variable u(0). 
The necessary conditions for a maximum are given in Appendix 3.1. These yield the 
following conditions determining e and x for each 0:
where p(0) is the costate variable for the optimal control problem (6) and, as such, 
represents the owner’s shadow price of information rents. In Appendix 3.1 it is shown 
that p(0)=F(0). F(0) is the cumulative distribution function associated with the density
f(0).
To examine the implications of the optimal output condition (7) it is useful to 
rewrite its right-hand side using the incentive compatibility condition (4):
The left-hand side represents the expected marginal profits with respect to output in the 
absence of hierarchic effects. The right-hand side represents the marginal information 
cost of output since -du'(0)/dx is the change in the slope of the informational rent profile 
with respect to a change in output. Condition (7a) can be used to establish what we 
need to assume for the asymmetric information output level to be lower than the full 
information level of output. In the full information case output must be chosen so that
[p ’ + s - Cx]f(0) = - p(0)yxiK , (7)
[-ce- i|/']f(0)= -n(0)[Yer  ♦ Y * ' L (8)
(7a)
the left-hand side will be zero. In the asymmetric information case if yx<0 (so that 
du'(0)/dx<O) output must be chosen so that the left-hand side will be positive. Hence
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assuming yx<0 insures that the asymmetric information level of output will be lower than 
the level of output which would prevail if the owner had full information.
Turning to consider the optimal effort condition (8) it is again useful to use (4) 
to rewrite the right-hand side:
[-ce- « |r']f(0 )=  (8a)
de
The left-hand side represents the expected net marginal benefit of increased effort in the 
absence of hierarchic effects. The right-hand side represents the marginal information 
cost of effort since -du'(0)/de is the change in the slope of the informational rent profile 
with respect to a change in effort. Examining the right-hand side of (8) it is clear that 
ye^ 0 is sufficient for -du'(6)/de>0 and hence a positive right-hand side. Consequently 
if Ye^O the optimal level of effort will be below the level of effort which would have 
prevailed if the owner had full information.
It is commonly perceived that hierarchical relationships lead to both slack and 
low levels of output4. Therefore this chapter concentrates upon the case where effort 
and output are set below the full information levels. From the above discussion we can 
write a sufficient condition for this case as
y x^ 0 and ye^ 0. (9)
When considering this condition it is useful to remember how y is defined. That is, since 
y can be described as the marginal rate at which effort must be substituted for 
inherent productivity to maintain a given cost of production. Assuming that yx<0 is 
saying that as output increases, the cost-reducing effect of a marginal increase in 
inherent productivity will proportionately exceed the cost-reducing effect of increased
4. See, for example, Dearden et al. (1990).
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effort. Assuming that ye<0 is saying that as effort increases, more effort needs to be 
substituted for a given fall in productivity so as to maintain a given cost.
Ill: When will Reducing Protection cause Increased Managerial Effort?
In this section we examine what assumptions are necessary for us to be able to
obtain comparative static results which are consistent with the cold shower hypothesis.
Let us consider a reduction in the subsidy5. To do this we differentiate (7) and (8) with
respect to s, we obtain
dx_ f ( d ) d ^ ä  3e f(8 ) a 2^
0s JK d e 2 ds H dedx
where Sf is the Hamiltonian for the optimisation problem (6) and • >0 is the Hessian 
determinant of ££. Since $£ is assumed to be strictly concave in (x,e) it follows that 
dx/ds>0 and
sgn —  = sgn = s g n [- f (e )C ex.F ( 0 ) [ Y ex>|'' * YXV "]] • (10)
0s dedx
Consider the expression on the right-hand side of (10). The first term (-^0)0*) 
represents how with increased output it is profit maximising to increase the level of 
effort given that effort is not an inferior good (C^cO). So according to this effect a 
decrease in protection would reduce effort since with lower output there would be less 
marginal return from expending effort. If a reduction in protection does increase effort 
it is purely due to the owner’s marginal informational cost of effort being increased as
5. The reason for selecting a subsidy as the protective instrument being considered is that all the relevant 
effects are on the production side. There would be nothing to be gained by looking at the standard 
consumption side distortions which accompany a tariff.
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output is reduced. This can be seen from looking at the following necessary condition 
for de/ds<0;
Clearly this condition will only hold for certain cost functions. If condition (9) holds yx 
will be non-positive. However y« is actually a third derivative and hence very little can 
be said about what its sign might be. What can be said is that it is easy to come up with 
examples of cost functions where (11) holds such as 
C (0 ,e ,x )  = A - ex 2 + 0 x 3 .
A class of cost function which is interesting to consider are those where effort only 
affects fixed costs. An example of such a cost function is 
C (0 ,e ,x )  = A - e + 0x .
In this case condition (11) holds and since 0^=0 we can say from (10) that de/ds<0. 
Now let us consider the general form of this class of function;
It is simple to show that this will yield de/ds<0 if it is assumed that productivity type is 
not an inferior input. This assumption means that the more productive the manager is 
(the lower 0 is) the lower marginal cost (rx) will be; rx0>O. We can say that if this is the 
case then condition (11) will hold. That is




This case where effort only reduces fixed cost seems quite plausible. This is because in 
many situations the primary role of a manager is to set up a particular productive 
process. If a reduced level of managerial effort is devoted to this task then one would
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expect that greater quantities of other inputs would be used in setting up. That is fixed 
costs (or perhaps more exactly quasi-fixed costs6) would be higher.
IV: An ‘X-inefficiencv Cost’ of Protection
The comparative static results in the previous section are of interest in their own 
right. However they prompt the question as to whether, from a social welfare view 
point, we should care about a reduction in effort caused by an increase in the subsidy. 
In this section it is shown that it is possible to identify a welfare cost associated with a 
such a reduction in effort. A change in the subsidy affects the owner, the manager and 
the taxpayers. Obviously an increase in the subsidy will make the taxpayers worse off. 
However we can not make any general comment as to whether the manager is made 
worse or better off. From Appendix 3.2 it is clear that the owner is made better off:
Total social surplus W consists of the owner’s expected profit plus the expected utility 
o f the manager minus the cost of the subsidy to the taxpayers (financed by lump-sum 
taxes). Hence for a given value of 0 it is defined as
Using (12) we can write out the following expression for the effect of an increase in the 
subsidy on the social surplus:
( 12)
0 , 0
W (0) = E ti (0) + u (0 )-  sx . (13)
6. See Varian (1993, p.342).
f(0) de—  [ w (e )f (0 )de=  [ f x ( 0 ) * - ^ ^ - x ( e ) - s ^ ^  
ds J  J ds ds
0 i 0 i
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J  u(0)f(0)d0 .
0i
( 1 4 )
Here the overall welfare change is decomposed into two components. The first term on 
the right-hand-side represents the standard marginal deadweight loss associated with the 
subsidy. The second term is labelled the ‘organisational cost of protection’. This term 
is only present because the manager receives an information rent. Clearly it could be 
positive in which case we would be dealing with an organisational benefit. There will 
only be an organisational cost if an increase in the subsidy causes a reduction in 
information rents. This result may seem somewhat counter-intuitive. However it needs 
to be remembered that the payment of information rent is simply a transfer between the 
owner and the manager. In principle the organisational cost of an increase in the subsidy 
could be measured by the change in incentive payments. In practice it would seem very 
difficult to isolate pure managerial incentive payments.
The X-inefficiency cost of protection is that component of the organisational 
costs which represents the welfare costs associated with the change in effort caused by 




f  u(0)f(0)d0 = - f  F(0) yx 'K  —  * (y * ♦ ' ) —
Hq HqJ
° i
J Uj  Ud
(15)
as can be seen from Appendix 3.2. Hence the X-inefficiency cost can be written as
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The case that we focus upon here is where output and effort are below their full 
information values (condition (9)) and there is a negative relationship between the size 
of the subsidy and the level of effort (a cold shower effect). Here y ^ ^ d x /d s) will be 
negative (since dx/ds>0) and (Ye^'+ytlOCde/ds) will be positive. Thus if there is an 
organisational cost (rather than a benefit) this outcome will be driven by the X- 
inefficiency cost of protection being sufficiently large to offset the organisational benefit 
effect associated with the change in output. This is a particularly appealing result since 
it links a welfare cost with a cold shower. However it should be noted that if output and 
effort are above their full information levels a cold shower would have an X-inefficiency 
benefit associated with it.
V: Concluding Comments
Like the earlier cold shower literature this analysis only gives qualified support 
for the contention that increasing the level of protection will reduce the level of 
managerial effort. However, unlike the Corden/Martin model it gives a cold shower 
story which is not a strawman. The tenor of Corden’s discussion of the cold shower 
story is to treat it as an idea that should be regarded with suspicion. The general attitude 
is that a backward bending supply of effort curve would not be a particularly wide 
spread phenomena. Suppose that we try applying the Corden/Martin model to the 
situation where the firm in question is a corporation rather than an entrepreneurial firm. 
To do so it would be necessary to assume that the corporation’s management is free to 
determine its level of effort. This is rather a strong assumption since it requires the 
owners of the corporation to be essentially passive and hence it ignores the influence of
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sophisticated institutional investors. By contrast, the principal-agent framework used 
in this chapter reflects reasonably well the hierarchical nature of the corporate firm. 
That is the firm is treated as a profit-maximising entity which has the problem of the 
owner who makes the profit-maximising decisions not having full information. It should 
also be noted that if the information asymmetry was, say, between a supervisor and 
workers, the important results from the analysis still stand.
Finally it is worth noting that the cold shower effect identified in this chapter 
does not represent a formalisation of the folklore notion of trade liberalization causing 
managerial effort to increase due to the increased competitive pressure which the 
previously protected firms now face. Both before and after a trade liberalization our 
owner acts to maximise profit and our manager responds to the incentives given by the 
owner. That is, neither the owner nor the manager are affected by a fear of the firm 
getting into financial difficulties once the protection is removed.
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APPENDIX 3.1: FIRST ORDER CONDITION FOR THE OWNER’S
PROBLEM
The Hamiltonian for the problem (6) is
= [(p% s)x - C (0,e,x) - u(0) - i|r(e)]f(0) + PW Y ^'C e), 
where p(0) is the costate variable. The necessary conditions satisfied by a solution to 
the problem are:
= [p + s - C J f(0 )  + PY J f '  = 0, 
dx
(Al)
- - [ C , .  <fr']f(0) * 1 1 1 » '  4 Y'l'"] = 0, 
d e
(A2)
u '(0)=  Y + 'M , (A3)
0c£
»» '(0 )------ — - <10). (A4)
du
n ( 0 , ) - o . (A5)
H(02) a O ,  u(0j) a 0, n(02)u(0j) = 0 . (A6)
Note that (Al) and (A2) yield equations (7) and (8) in the body of the chapter. Also, 
from (A4) and (A5), we have
p(0) = F(0) > 0. (A7)
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APPENDIX 3.2: DISTRIBUTIONAL AND W ELFARE EFFECTS OF A
CHANGE IN THE SUBSIDY
Derivation o f Equation (12). Using the definition of the Lagrangian, integrating 
by parts and using (A4), (A5) and (A6), the owner’s expected profits are
02 e2
j  Eti (0)f(0) d(0) = | [ c £ - n ( 0 ) u ' ( 0 ) ]  d0
0i o,
02






= I  {[(P’+ s)x-C(0,e ,x)- i |r (e)]f(0)
0 i
♦ p(0>Y^/} d 0 .
Differentiating with respect to s and using the first order conditions (A 1) and (A2) yields 
equation (12) in the body of the chapter.
Derivation o f Equation (15). Use integration by parts to obtain
02 02
/  u(0)f(0)d0 = [u(02)F(02) - - 1  u '(0)F(Ö)d0
0 i 0 i
02
= - f  u'WFfOJd©, using (A5)-(A7).
Noting that
—  u'(0) = —  (Y'l'')* —  * (Ye’K*
ds ds ds ds
[from (4)] and differentiating with respect to s yields equation (15) in the body of the 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: PROTECTION REDUCTIONS AND INVESTMENT IN NEW
TECHNOLOGY
I: Introduction
This chapter uses a simple decision-theoretic model to provide a possible 
rationalisation for the idea that a reduction in protection can facilitate investment in new 
technology. Consider the case where the removal of a firm’s protection would result in 
it ceasing to survive with its cument cost structure. To many non-economists it would 
be almost axiomatic that removing the firm’s protection increases its incentive to invest 
in cost-reducing new technology1. However if the question is given greater attention it 
becomes clear that the benefit from a cost-reducing investment would be greater prior 
to the removal of protection2. The approach taken here hinges on regarding the 
outcome of the investment as being stochastic3. For simplicity a two-point distribution 
is assumed. The good outcome is a reduction in cost sufficient for the firm to continue 
production with or without the protection. The bad outcome is a reduction in costs 
which is not sufficient for the resulting operating profits to cover the cost of the 
investment so that bankruptcy occurs. The decision as to whether or not to make the 
investment is made by an owner/manager whose utility is solely a function of income. 
Thus there is a departure from the X-efficiency tradition which focuses on managerial
1. Knight (1967), writing in the business administration literature, describes this as ‘distress innovation’.
2. For a formal treatment of this point see Rodrik (1990).
The US Congressional Budget Office (1986 p.9) consider that protected firms may be less inclined 




The ‘cold shower scenario’ which will be formalised runs in the following 
manner. The owner/manager first evaluates the investment while the firm is protected. 
The investment is rejected since the expected utility from proceeding with it is exceeded 
by the utility to be gained by continued use of the old technology. With the removal of 
the protection the investment is re-evaluated. The return from the good outcome is, of 
course, reduced. The return from the bad outcome remains the same because of limited 
liability. That is, with or without the protection, the owner/manager receives the income 
stream associated with bankruptcy. The return from not making the investment is 
reduced to the income stream associated with exiting from the industry. If the fall in 
utility associated with not investing exceeds the fall in utility associated with the good 
outcome, weighted by the probability that the good outcome occurs, then it is possible 
that the removal of the protection will result in the investment being made.
Essentially this analysis is an application of the fundamental insight from Golbe 
(1981) that imminent bankruptcy can affect equity holders’ risk preferences with respect 
to the firm’s returns. When bankruptcy is imminent the lower tail of the distribution of 
equity holders’ returns is truncated because of limited liability. Hence equity holders 
who are risk-neutral or risk-averse with respect to their own returns may prefer the firm 
to engage in behaviour which would imply risk-loving preferences if it were not for the 
effect of imminent bankruptcy.
A point which is emphasised in this chapter is that the more averse the 
owner/manager is to losing the firm the more likely the cold shower scenario will occur. 
While the protection is in place there is only a positive probability of losing the firm (due 
to bankruptcy) if the investment is made. Once the protection is removed, deciding not
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to invest is synonymous with deciding to exit from the industry (losing the firm 
voluntarily). It seems reasonable to believe that the discounted income stream 
associated with losing the firm, either by voluntary exit or bankruptcy, is relatively low. 
With voluntary exit the owner/manager is taken to suffer a loss in industry-specific 
human capital. With bankruptcy, the penalty is taken to be even more severe since an 
association with a bankruptcy injures managerial reputation. Smith and Stulz (1985) 
consider bankruptcy aversion as one of a number of factors which may impact upon the 
extent of hedging by value-maximising corporations. Hedging reduces the variability of 
the value of the firm, hence reducing the probability of incurring the transaction costs 
associated with bankruptcy.
The contractual relationship between the owner/manager and the financial 
institution which funds the investment is clearly important. One stream within the 
bankruptcy literature consists of developing formal principal-agent models to investigate 
what type of incentive-compatible debt contracts may be entered into by a firm and its 
creditor. Both Diamond (1984) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) show asymmetric 
information cases where the optimal debt contract requires the debtor firm to be 
declared bankrupt if fixed payments on the debt are not met. The idea is that if the 
creditor is committed to the threat of inflicting bankruptcy upon the firm then the firm 
will have an incentive to meet its contractual payments if it has the ability to do so. This 
ability to pay, that is the success of the investment, is the information asymmetry 
featured in these two papers. The model used in this chapter does not have a firm- 
creditor informational relationship which is tailored to fit the principal-agent paradigm. 
Initially it is assumed that the creditor is unaware of how risky the investment is, but 
does know that bankruptcy represents a substantial penalty for default. The other case
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examined is where the creditor does know the probability of the bad outcome occurring 
and so is able to attach to a risk premium to the rate of interest. In both cases the firm 
is declared bankrupt if the required payment to the creditor can not be made. That is, 
the penalty for default is the owner/manager losing the status of being the residual 
claimant with control over the firm.
It is convenient to work using the assumption that a single, initially subsidized, 
domestic firm faces a price determined by a competitive world market. However the 
chapter also looks at the case where there are just two firms; the domestic firm and one 
foreign firm. This oligopolistic version of the model is useful for comparing the effect 
o f the removal of a tariff with that of a quota. It is also useful for comparing the 
implications of Stackelberg behaviour with the implications of Cournot behaviour. An 
oligopolistic version of the model with n foreign firms is used to consider the 
relationship between the market power of the protected firm and the likelihood of a cold 
shower occurring.
The chapter is organized in the following manner. Section II specifies the 
situation which is being modelled. Sections III and IV establish criteria for whether to 
invest in the cost reducing technology. In Section V a condition is devised for the 
removal of protection to make the acceptance of the investment more likely. Section 
VI illustrates the cold shower scenario with a numerical example. In Section VII the 
case where the creditor knows the probability of the bad outcome is considered. Section 
VIII utilizes an oligopolistic version of the model with one domestic firm and one 
foreign firm. In Section IX the case where there are n foreign firms is considered. 
Finally Section X makes a number of concluding comments including some 
consideration of what normative implications can be drawn out of the analysis.
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II: Introducing the Model
This model is designed to establish conditions under which firms will respond to 
a withdrawal of assistance by investing in cost-reducing technology. While, the model 
explicitly deals with a firm controlled by an owner/manager, the model is still relevant 
to firms where ownership is separated from control. The situation being modelled in this 
section has the following features:
(a) The industry structure is characterized by a large number of foreign firms and a 
single domestic firm.
(b) Operating costs differ between firms allowing supernormal profits to be made by 
the lower cost firms with the rents going to those fixed factors which give the 
cost advantage.
(c) The domestic firm’s minimum average cost of production is higher than the 
market price p. Hence, given its cost structure, it is only able to operate 
profitably with the assistance of the output subsidy, s, which it receives.
(d) The utility of income function for the owner/manager of this firm has the 
following standard restrictions:
u'(.)  > 0, u(0) = 0 .
(While risk aversion would be a natural assumption to make, a case is shown 
where risk aversion is not required in order to get a cold shower result.)
If the owner/manager’s discounted income stream falls below T then the decision 
is taken to cease operating, sell the firm’s assets for scrap, pay any contractual
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compensation due to workers, and then engage in the next best alternative. 
Taking this action leaves the owner/manager with T. If the firm incurs debts and 
then is unable to meet its obligations to its creditor, the now bankrupt 
owner/manager’s discounted income stream falls to Z (where Z < T). The firm’s 
bankruptcy can be thought of two in ways. The creditor may take the firm’s 
assets and sell them for scrap so as to recover some proportion of the debt. This 
leaves the owner/manager labelled as a failed manager who is hence only able to 
earn Z from any future employment. Alternatively bankruptcy could be 
interpreted as the creditor intervening in the affairs of the firm and requiring the 
owner/manager to work for Z with the surplus of operating profit going to the 
creditor.4 This stylized representation of bankruptcy being viewed as costly by 
managers is consistent with recent empirical studies. Gilson (1989) examines a 
large sample of firms that experienced extreme common stock price declines. 
Gilson finds the turnover of top managers is far higher for those firms classed as 
being ‘financially distressed’. It is of particular interest that Gilson finds that the 
managers who lost their position from a financially distressed firm did not find 
similar management positions in the following three years. Gilson also notes that 
following a default the creditors have a considerable influence over decision 
making within the firm. Hence managers, who did not immediately lose their 
position, would probably experience a substantial fall in utility.
4 . For a discussion of the creditor’s choice between opting for bankruptcy or continuing to extend credit 
see Bulow and Shoven (1978).
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(e) The firm has the option of investing in a cost-reducing technology5 but is 
uncertain about the extent to which costs would actually be reduced. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that there are only two possible outcomes; good and 
bad, the lower cost curves being respectively denoted CG(.) and CB(.).
(f) The good outcome refers to when the present value of the increase in operating 
profits summed to infinity exceeds the cost of the investment. Thus the firm can 
repay the interest on the investment cost to its creditor and gain some surplus on 
top of that.
(g) The bad outcome refers to when the resulting present value of operating profits 
summed to infinity is less than the cost of the investment. That is, the bad 
outcome breaks the bankruptcy constraint since the firm is making insufficient 
operating profits to be able to cover the interest on the cost of the investment.
(h) If the owner/manager decides to make the investment, then for simplicity it is 
assumed that the cost of the investment I is borrowed from a single creditor in 
perpetuity. Initially it is assumed that the creditor is uninformed with respect to 
the expected return on potential investments. However the creditor can observe 
which potential borrowers, such as the owner/manager, have a high aversion to 
bankruptcy. Hence the aversion of borrowers to bankruptcy mitigates the 
adverse selection problem by tending to deter ‘bad-risk’ borrowers from
5. This technology is assumed to be mature in the sense that the firm has nothing to gain by deciding 
to delay its adoption. Jensen (1982) shows that delaying adoption may be optimal if the firm gathers 
information on the new technology's profitability over time. It would be interesting to know if there 
are instances of protection slowing down such an information gathering process.
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applying for loans. Thus if the owner/manager does apply for the loan of I, the 
creditor’s ‘rule of thumb’ is to approve this loan at the market clearing interest 
rate i.
I ll :  The Investment Decision While Assisted
The condition is now derived for the owner/manager to reject the investment in cost- 
reducing technology while the regime of assistance remains in place.
Operating profits with a subsidy are;-
where ö0s refers to when the new technology is not adopted,
6 gs ,6 bs refer respectively to the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ outcomes from adopting the 
new technology. These outcomes are a result of the cost curves shifting 
downward.
Ex post utility levels of the possible outcomes following the decision as to whether to 
adopt the new technology when subsidized are:- 
No Investment:
6j = (p . s).x0' -  C0(x^) > 0
*0= (P * s) xo’ - Cq(xo) > 0 
4 b = (p . s).xB’ - CB(xB*)> 0
u(JtJ) > u (T ) ,
0
Good Outcome:
u (* 0  - I) > u (T ) ,
Bad Outcome:
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Clearly if the return in terms of expected utility, Eu^, is negative the owner/manager will 
reject the investment in new technology;
Eu,' = g.u(nj, - I) * (1 - g).u(Z) - u(uj) (1)
- g [u(*o- - U(ZXI * [u(Z)- u(7tj)] (la)
where g is the probability that the good outcome will occur.
The first term of expression (1) represents the ex ante utility from the good outcome. 
The second term represents the ex ante utility from the bad outcome. The third term 
represents the utility from not making the investment. For the investment to be rejected 
the third term will need to outweigh the first and second terms. Eu,s is more likely to be 
negative, for higher values of I, and tt0s, and lower values of g, Z and 7iGs.
IV: The Investment Decision with Assistance Removed
Here the condition is derived for the owner/manager to accept the previously rejected 
investment once the assistance is removed.
Operating profits with the subsidy removed are;-
6 0 = 0 since by assumption p .x0* - C Q(x0*) < 0 where x ’ is any x 
= P xo " C0 (Xq) > 0 
ÖB = P XB • C b(Xb) > 0 0r < °-
Ex post utility levels of the possible outcomes following the decision of whether to adopt 





u ( tig - 1) > u(T)
Bad Outcome:
u(Z) since 7iBs - 1 < 0 (Bankruptcy condition) => tib - 1 < 0
An obvious difference in circumstances from the protected case is that now using the old 
technology it is not possible to make a non-negative operating profit. Clearly this is a 
sufficient condition for the decision not to invest to be synonymous with the ‘voluntary 
exit’ option being taken which gives a payoff of u(T). The assumption of u ( tcg-I) > u(T) 
is clearly necessary for there to be any possibility that the owner/manager will attempt 
to remain within the industry by deciding to invest. The bad outcome must result in 
bankruptcy since it has already been assumed that this occurs even with the benefit of 
the subsidy. Bearing this in mind, it is clearly unimportant whether the operating profit 
from the bad outcome falls below zero without the subsidy since the owner/manager’s 
choice between exit and investment is unaffected by it.6
Expected utility from adopting the new technology is now;-
Eu, . g .u (n 0 - I) .  (1 - g).u(Z ) - u(T ) (2)
- g .[u (* 0 - I) - U ( Z)] . [ u ( Z )  - u( T)] (2a)
- note that EUj = g.[u(7t0 - I) - u(Z)] when Z = T.
6 This can be said because 0B < il which follows from the initial assumption that 0 B* < il.
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It can be seen from expression (2) that both the expected payoff from investing and the 
payoff from not investing are, as one would expect, reduced by the removal of the 
subsidy. So it cannot be said definitely whether the removal of the subsidy moves the 
net expected utility from the investment in either a positive or negative direction. Before 
going on to look at this ambiguity in the next section it is worth noting the importance 
of T being higher than Z. If Z was to actually be equal to T it would be the extreme case 
where it is no more costly to be ‘driven from’ the industry by bankruptcy than to make 
an ‘orderly retreat’ by deciding to exit from the industry in response to the removal of 
assistance. In this case the previously rejected technology would be adopted no matter 
how close g is to zero. The reason for this resuit is that choosing to invest gives the 
owner/manager some chance (however small) of avoiding the low utility outcome of 
u(T) = u(Z) which would be incurred with certainty if the ‘no-investment’ - ‘voluntary 
exit’ option were to be taken. As long as T > Z, there needs to be a large enough 
expected profit from investing to offset u(Z) - u(T) for E ^  to be positive (see expression 
(2a)). Hence self selection protects the creditor from applications from ‘really bad 
risks’.
V: A Cold Shower Condition
Here a condition is derived for the removal of the subsidy to encourage the 
adoption of cost reducing technology. This ‘cold shower condition’ summarizes this 
analysis by identifying when the adoption of such technology is less likely prior to the 
removal of the subsidy. The cold shower condition is defined as;-
Euj - Eu,s > 0 (3)
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This condition is consistent with the following three scenarios;-
(a) Eu,s < 0 , Eu, > 0 ; Eu,s < Eu,
That is, the cost-reducing technology is not adopted when assisted but is adopted once 
the subsidy is removed.
(b) Eu,s > 0 , Eu, > 0 ; Eujs < Eu,
That is, the cost-reducing technology is adopted in the presence of the subsidy however 
the incentive to do so becomes greatest once the subsidy is removed.
(c) Eu,s < 0 , Eu, < 0 ; Eu,s < Eu,
That is, the cost-reducing technology is not adopted either prior to or following the 
removal of the subsidy however without the subsidy the incentive not to adopt the cost- 
reducing technology is weaker.
From expressions (la) and (2a) the cold shower condition can be written as:
[U(* S) - U(T)] - g. [u(* o - 1) - u(it Q- 1)] > 0 (3a)
The first term represents the difference between the utility from not investing when 
subsidized and the utility from not investing when not subsidized. The second term 
represents the expected value of the difference between the utility from the good 
outcome when subsidized and the good outcome when not subsidized. Clearly the lower 
g is, the more likely it is that the cold shower condition holds. However, as noted in the 
last section, if g is too low then the investment will be rejected in the not-subsidized 
situation as well as the subsidized situation. It can be noted that the losses from the bad 
outcome do not appear in this expression. This is because the expected fall in utility
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associated with obtaining a bad outcome does not change with the removal of the 
subsidy.
VI: A Numerical Illustration
At this point it is useful to provide an example of where a previously rejected 
investment is accepted following the removal of the subsidy. The following cost 
functions represent the initial technology, the good outcome technology, and the bad 
outcome technology respectively.
C 0 = 0 .0 4 x 3 - 0 .8 x 2 + 20x min A C 0 = 16 
C Q = 0 .0 4 x 3 - 0 .8 x 2 + lOx -* min A C Q * 6
C B = 0 .0 4 x 3 - 0 .8 x 2 + 18x -* min A C ß = 14
The values for the variables are: 
p = 15, s = 2 ,1 = 1000, T = 10, Z = 5, g = 0.1, i = 0.1.
To emphasize that it is not always necessary to assume risk aversion, utility is initially 
treated as being synonymous with income.
Calculating the possible profits and hence the returns from investing gives the 
cold shower scenario:
Jtj « 105.6, n'Q -  1537.3, tiJ, -  344.0 , -  1209.6, -  105.6
E u ,’ * 0 .1 (537 .3 ) .  0 .9 (5) - 105.6 -  -47
Eu, -  0 .1 (209 .6 ) ♦ 0 .9 (5 ) - 10 -  15
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Here, making the investment is clearly taking ‘a long shot’ since g = 0.1. This bet 
becomes worth taking when the removal of protection makes not investing synonymous 
with leaving the industry and receiving only T. The relatively low values of T and Z 
represent the penalty the owner/manager faces for losing the firm. Without the subsidy 
the only strategy which will give a chance of not incurring this penalty is to invest.
If this example is modified by making the owner/manager risk-averse then it is 
possible to impose a far higher probability of success and still have the investment 
rejected while receiving the subsidy. The modifications introduced consist of: 
u = (.),/10 and g = 0.5.
The returns which result are:
E u ,' -  0.5(1.8751 ) ♦ 0.5(1.1746 ) - 1.5936 -  -0.07 
E u , -  0.5(1.7066 ) * 0.5(1.1746 ) - 1.2589 -  0.18
VII: When the Expected Value of the Investment is Known by the Creditor
Assuming the creditor operates on the basis of having no information about the 
expected returns on individual investments obviously underrates the information 
available to financial institutions. In this section it is assumed that the creditor knows 
both the potential profit flows and the probabilities associated with the good and bad 
outcomes. Competition in the credit market insures that the rate of interest charged by 
the creditor is only high enough to insure a normal rate of return in expected terms. 
Without a positive probability of default a normal return upon the loan would be the 
payment of i.I each period with a present value, over an infinite number of periods, of
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I. Taking into account the probability of the bad outcome, and hence default, the 
creditor requires a rate of interest which is higher than i. Consequently the costs of 
making the investment when subsidized and when not subsidized are defined respectively 
as;-
r ‘ rK * = —  .1 K - -.1
i i
where f  and r are respectively the rates of interest charged with and without the subsidy. 
Now the relationship between I and the present-value cost of the loan is;-
g.K ( l -g ) .B  M  =* K 
Similarly
, = I- (l g) B « 
g
g
where Bs and B refer to the present value of the loan to the creditor if the bad outcome 
has eventuated and so bankruptcy has been declared.
If the bankrupt firm continued to operate under the ownership of the creditor with the
former owner/manager paid Z, then;-
B ‘ - * ' - Z  
and
B = 7tß-Z , if 7tß  ^Z 
or
B = 0 , if tib< Z
Deciding upon this particular functional form is somewhat arbitrary. The important idea 
is that the reduction in bad-outcome operating profits when the subsidy is removed 
implies that the cost of getting the loan to make the investment increases. So, instead 
of the utility associated with the good outcome being reduced from u(7tQ -I)to
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u(7i Q-1 ) , it is reduced from u(tc *q - K *) to u(7t Q- K ) . However a cold shower effect 
can still occur even though removing the subsidy does cause a greater fall in the utility 
associated with the good outcome. Limited liability still means that removing the 
subsidy does not affect the payoff from the bad outcome. It is easy to modify the 
numerical illustration presented in Section VI to illustrate this point. The modifications 
to the initial illustration consist of:
I = 600 , g = 0.5 , and u = (.)1/10.
The returns which result are:
Euj* = g u(7tQ-K V O -gJ-uC Z ^i iO j)
-  0.5(1.9187 ) + 0 .5 (1 .1746)-1 .5936
-  -0 .05
Eu, = g.u(n0 -K) + (l -g) .u(Z)-u(T)
-  0.5(1.6004 ) + 0 .5 (1 .1 7 4 6 )- 1.2589
-  0.13 .
It is important to note that in this illustration, making the investment cannot be thought 
of as taking a ‘long shot’. A very small g would result in the creditor insisting on a 
prohibitively high interest rate. So that making the investment in response to removal 
of the subsidy would result in bankruptcy even if the good outcome did eventuate. With 
g=0.5 the investment represents a bet which a risk-neutral owner/manager would accept, 
with or without the subsidy, but our risk-averse owner/manager rejects when subsidized. 
With the removal of the subsidy the payoff from rejecting the investment (voluntary exit) 
is little more than the payoff from the bad outcome (bankruptcy). Hence the ‘one way 
bet’ aspect of the investment negates the effect of risk aversion so that the
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owner/manager accepts the investment.
VIII: Imperfect Competition Issues
In this section the assumption of a competitive world market is dispensed with. 
Instead there is a duopoly consisting of a foreign firm and a domestic firm. For 
simplicity both firms are assumed to have a constant marginal cost technology and it is 
assumed that demand is linear. Just as before, the domestic firm faces the choice of 
whether to invest in cost-reducing technology. It is assumed that the new technology 
simply has the effect of lowering the domestic firm’s constant marginal cost. In addition, 
the analysis is restricted to the risk-neutral case with the ‘uninformed’ creditor. It is 
analytically convenient to adopt a static one-period framework where I (investment) is 
simply treated as a fixed cost.
The first issue to be considered here is whether the likelihood of a cold shower 
is affected by whether it is a tariff or a quota which is removed7. If the firms engage in 
Cournot competition, following the choice as to whether to make the investment, the 
cold shower effect is more likely if the protective instrument in question is a quota8. It 
will be shown that with a quota in place making the investment has a lower expected 
return than if an equivalent tariff had have been in place. The consequence of this is that 
it is more likely in the case of the quota that the investment is rejected if protection is in
7. For a guide to the standard trade policy literature on the differing effects of tariffs and quotas see 
Vousden (1990).
8. In this analysis the domestic firm needs to know the potential price/quantity outcomes associated with 
investing or not investing. This does not sit comfortably with the Cournot model having conjectural 
variations equal to zero. Hence perhaps it should be said that "the firms compete Cournot style". 
Kreps (p448,1990) uses this label for when firms simultaneously and independently set quantity with 
price clearing the market.
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place but is accepted if the protection is not in place.
To begin the analysis, consider the following expression for profit when there is 
a tariff upon imports:
7i 1 = x.[a-b.(x + y)]-c.x  
7t4 = y.[a-b.(x+y)]-c'.y-t.y
where;
x and y refer respectively to the domestically produced and imported 
quantities sold;
c and c* refer respectively to the domestic and foreign firm's marginal 
cost;
t refers to the tariff levied on each unit imported.
The reaction functions for each of the firms are as follows:
a- c- b.y x = ---------- —
2b
a- c- 2b.x (RF)
 ^ b
a - b.x-(c *+1)
(R F ,')y  - ,
2b
The Cournot equilibrium profit for the domestic firm is
[a- 2c .  (c'* t)]2
71 =  ---------------------------------------------------- .
9b
Hence the payoff from not investing is
, [a -2c  * ( c M ) ] J




The payoff from investing when the good outcome occurs is
" o - I
[a -2 c0 * ( c \ t ) ] 2 t
------------- 7 ------------------  1 " o  ■
If investment takes place and the bad outcome occurs then bankruptcy results giving the 
owner/manager a payoff of Z.
Hence the expected return from investing if protected by a tariff is
Eu/ = g.^c* - I) + (1 - g).Z - 71/.
With the removal of the tariff deciding not to invest is synonymous with the 
owner/manager deciding to exit from the industry. That is;
[a -2 c0* c -]2
< T .
Hence the payoff from not investing is T.
If investment takes place and the good outcome occurs then the payoff is
[a- 2cQ+ c']
" o -  1 -----------7T---------- I > T .
Consequently the expected return from investing becomes;
Ell! = g.(7iG - 1) + (1 - g).Z - T.
Now we consider how the investment decision would be affected if the 
protective instrument being considered were a quota. To make this comparison the tariff 
is set so exactly the same level of domestic output would be sold if there was a quota of 
Q. This output equivalence is applied to the situation where no investment is made. If 
the investment were to be made then it is assumed that there would be no change to t
or Q. Assuming that the quota is binding, the domestic firm solves the following
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problem to find its profit maximising output:
Max n
= >  x
x .[a-b.(x+Q)]-c0.x 
a- b.Q - c0
That is with the binding quota the foreign firm’s best response is to set y=Q. If a tariff 
is used, domestic output is set at
a- 2c0+ c *+1
Equating (5) and (6) allows us to obtain an expression for the tariff which results in a 
quota-equivalent output. This tariff is given by:
a- 3b.Q + c0- 2c *
2
Substituting (7) into (4) gives the profit associated with this tariff level: 
q (a- b.Q * C q ) 2
(7)
If the quota had been used an identical profit level would have been obtained. This 
result may initially seem surprising. To rationalize it consider Figure 4 .1 . If imports of 
y are restricted to Q then the foreign firm’s reaction function becomes RFQ‘. The 
resulting Coumot-Nash equilibrium yields a domestic output of XoQ, imports of Q and 
a domestic firm's profit of n0Q. The use of a tariff shifts the foreign firm’s reaction 
function RF‘ downward. So when the tariff is set so that XoQ is produced the foreign 
firm’s reaction function is RFt\  Once again the equilibrium quantities sold are x0Q and 
Q. Hence again profit is n0Q.
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Figure 4.1: Cournot Equilibrium Without the Investment
Q
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Now consider profit if the quota remains at Q but the investment is made with 
the good outcome so that the domestic firm’s marginal cost falls from c0 to cG :
q. ( a b Q - C p ) 2
710 ’ 4b
( 3 a - 3 c 0 -3b .Q)2
36b 1
Similarly, consider the good outcome profit if the tariff remains at t:
t .  ( a - 2 c 0+ c%t)2
* o -  1 ’ --------- TT------------ 19b
( 3 a - 4 c 0 >c„-3b.Q)2 ^
36b
Now:
-4cg + c0 > -3cg , since c0 > cG. 
Therefore n Gl > n GQ.
Using this result it is simple to show that there would be cases where with tariff 
protection or no protection the investment would be accepted while with quota 
protection the investment would be rejected. Recalling the cold shower expression (3), 
consider:
(Eu i - Eu ,Q) - (EU, - Eu,')
= Eu,' - Eu,Q
= g.(7ic'-I) + (l-g).Z - no1 - g.(7tGQ-I) - (l-g).Z + n 0Q 
= g.(rtG - *GQ) > 0.
To understand why examine Figure 4.2 . The effect of the reduction in
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marginal cost associated with the good outcome is represented by the outward shift of 
the domestic firm’s reaction curve (RF0 to RFG). In the case of the quota this does not 
affect the quantity of imports because the foreign firm’s reaction curve is horizontal. In 
contrast, with a tariff the foreign firm’s reaction curve RFt* has the conventional 
downward slope. Consequently imports fall from Q to yGl. So with the tariff the 
domestic firm is closer to its monopoly position (that being where RFG touches the x 
axis). tig‘ exceeds txgq not only because a higher quantity of x is sold but also because 
the price is higher. The prices are respectively;
Brander and Spencer (1988) contrast tariffs and quotas within a Cournot framework. 
In their model the domestic firm bargains with a trade union over wages. When a 
binding quota is used the union will negotiate higher wages because the increased cost 
of production will not affect the quantity of imports and hence there will be a relatively 
small impact upon employment.
Another imperfect competition issue is whether the domestic firm’s market 
power affects the likelihood of a cold shower. Here it is shown that when the domestic 
firm is a Stackelberg leader rather than a Cournot competitor the cold shower condition 
is more likely to hold. That is, an investment which has been rejected, while a tariff is 
in place, may be accepted with the removal of the tariff if the domestic firm is a 
Stackelberg leader, while remaining rejected if the domestic firm is a Cournot 
competitor. To consider what is necessary for this result to hold it is useful to restate 
the cold shower condition in the form used in expression (3a):
t 3a+ 2 cq + cq- 3b.Q 3a+ 3 cq - 3b.Q
6
W - T ]  - g. [^c-  > 0 . (9)
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The greater the magnitude of (9) the greater the difference between Eu,1 and Eu, and so 
for a given Eu,1 < 0 the more likely Eu, > 0. Considering the first term of (9) it is clear 
that this would be larger in the Stackelberg leader case. However for the Stackelberg 
case to make a cold shower more likely it is necessary for:
M  - T]sl - [TC0‘ - T]c > g.[7tG‘ - 7IG]SL - g.[TCG* - 7Tg]c .
From this it should be clear that the result that the Stackelberg case is more likely to 
induce a cold shower is a result which is not intuitively obvious.
The potential payoffs that the firm faces in the Stackelberg case differ from the 
Cournot case in that the profit becomes;
t [a -2 c +  (c *+1)]‘ 
8b
( 10)
This allows us to write comparable cold shower expressions for both cases: 
(E u , - E u , *)SL
- — [(1 - g ) t2* 2 t( l  - g )(a * c ')* 4 t(g .c0 - c )
8b
. ( a - 2 V c-)2] - T
(E u ,- E u , ^
- — [(1 - g ) t 2. 2 t( l  - g)(a* c")* 4 t(g .c0 - 
9b
* (a_ 2c0* c ')2] - T .
Now [(1 - g ) t2* 2 t( l  - g)(a* c ■)* 4 t(g .c0 - c0)
+ (a - 2c0+ c *)2] > 0 since we are only interested in the cases where the cold shower 
condition holds, EupEu,1^ .
Hence ( E u j - E u j1) ^  > ( E u j - E u j ^ .
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This result is saying that Stackelberg leadership will provide a stronger cold shower 
tendency and hence makes it more likely that a cold shower will actually occur.
IX: Cournot Competition with n Foreign Firms
In the previous section there is only one foreign firm. In this section there are 
n identical foreign firms, as well as the one domestic firm, selling on the domestic 
market. This allows us to further consider the question of the relationship between 
market power and the strength of cold shower effect. The relevant payoffs now become:
, [a - (n* l).c0* n.(c '♦ t)]2
*0 ■--------------- r------- > T
b.(n*2)2
[a-(n* l) .c0 *n .(cM )]2 
b.(n* 2)2
[a- (n* l) .cB+ n.(c’* t)]2
* o -  1 - I > 71
* B - I - I < 0
b.(n+1)1
[a- (n + l).c0* n.c ']2
21 o - -------------------7-------  < T
b.(n+ 2)2
[a - (n* l) .cG.n .c ']2
* o -  1
* B - 1
b.(n* 2)2
[a- (n* 1 )-Cg+ n.c-]2 
b.(n+ 2)2
- I > T
I < 0 .
A reduction in n means that there are fewer firms selling on the domestic market and 
hence the market power of the domestic firm is increased. To examine whether a lower
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n would imply an increase in strength in the cold shower we need to look at the sign of 
d [ E U j -  EujVdn •
E U j-E u j1 = it q - T + g.(n 0 - 7Uq) by simply rewriting (9).
Let us consider the derivative of this in two separate parts.
d* o -2 ta - (“ ♦ U - V  n (c * t)][a » c0 - 2(c *♦ t)] 
dn b.(n* 2)3
From examining the expressions for the profit maximising levels of output, for both the 
domestic firm and the representative foreign firm, it is clear that d7i0l/dn is negative as 
we are only concerned with cases where:
[a - (n* l) .c  ♦ n.(c% t)]
x -------------------- ----------------- > 0
b.(n+ 2)
[a* c - 2(c "t t)]
y . ------------------------- > 0
b.(n+ 2)
Now consider the second part of the derivative.
d [ g - 0 0- n 0)]
b.(n*2)3
[(n t2 ){ [a -(n .l) .c 0tn .c ’] [c '-c 0]
- [a - (nt 1 ).c0t n.(c ,+t)][(c Vt)- c j }
* { [a -(n tl) .c Q*n.(c M)]2 
- [a - (n .l) .c Gtn .c -]2}]
The sign of this derivative is ambiguous. The term within the first set of {.} brackets is 
negative. However the term within the second set of {.} brackets is positive. So we can 
not say for certain that d[EUj- E u ^ /d n  is negative. Hence it is useful to provide a 
numerical illustration showing a reduction in n strengthening the tendency for the cold 
shower to occur. The strategy used to devise this illustration is to begin with n set equal 
to 100 then select parameter values which gives the cold shower scenario of the 
investment being rejected when the tariff is in place but accepted when the tariff is
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removed. To consider an increase in market power the calculations are repeated with 
n set equal to 99. The parameter values selected are:
a=820, b= l, t=5, c0=20, cG=10, cB=20, c*=15, FC=10,1=120, g=0.2, T=10, Z=5. 
Note that a Fixed cost term has been included to facilitate getting the required cold 
shower scenario. With n=100 the following results are obtained:
n ' - 51.5, 184.9, jcb- I -  -68.5, -1.3, * 0-I"  34.9,
Eu,'- 0.2(184 .9). 0.8(5)-51.5 - -10.5,
Eu ,-  0.2(34.9). 0.8(5)- 10 -  1,
Eu,- Eu,* -  11.5.
Now consider how these results change when n=99:
n'0 -  52.7, Jtjj-I- 187.6, -67.3, n 0 -  -0.9, n 0- I -  36.9,
Eu,' -  0.2(187 .6). 0.8(5)-52.7 -  -11.2,
Eu, - 0.2(36.9). 0.8(5)- 10 -  1.4,
Eu,- Eu,' -  12.6.
So here the tendency for a cold shower is stronger if the domestic firm has more market 
power. Partly this result is being driven by n0l being larger when market power is 
greater. TCq1 is the profit which is given up if the investment is made while the tariff is in 
place. Obviously the larger this is, ceteris paribus, the less attractive the investment will 
be while the tariff is in place. Clearly the weighted return from the good outcome, 
g.(TtGl-I), increases as well but not enough to offset the increase in tx01. The other 
contributing factor to the increase in the strength of the tendency for a cold shower is 
the increase in g.(rcG-I). This increase means that, following the removal of the tariff, 
the expected return from deciding to invest, rather than leave the industry, is increased.
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X: Concluding Comments
This chapter represents a departure from the standard approach to the cold 
shower question which focuses on managerial effort. Rather its focus is on how 
protection can affect the technological investment decisions made within firms. While, 
in reality, managerial effort considerations may well influence investment decisions, this 
issue is abstracted from here. Also a reluctance to invest in new technology may be 
influenced by fears that reducing cost would result in the removal of protection. 
However in this chapter protection policy is regarding as being exogenous to the firm. 
The removal of the protection can be thought as the government having a change in 
attitude to whether, in general, protection can be seen as beneficial or not.
No pretence is made that this analysis has universal applicability to protected 
industries. Clearly there are cases where, even with the best possible outcome from 
investment in cost-reducing technology, the industry will not survive without protection. 
Examples of such industries in OECD countries are to be found within the textiles and 
apparel sectors9. There would also be cases where the issue of limited liability is 
irrelevant. Think of a subsidy being paid on the sales of a commodity which is produced 
by a small division of a large multidivisional, or M-form, firm10. If this subsidy is 
removed, and then investment takes place with the bad outcome occurring, the solvent 
M-form firm will face the full cost of having made the investment.
In the case where the creditor is well informed about the potential investment, 
the creditor’s behaviour is uncontroversial given the credit market is competitive. In the
9. For detailed industry studies see OECD (1988).
10. For a discussion of the M-form concept see Williamson (1975, Ch.8).
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case where the creditor’s only knows that the owner/manager is averse to bankruptcy 
a somewhat arbitrary treatment of creditor is required. Essentially the creditor’s ‘rule 
of thumb’ is; be prepared to lend to the firm even though uniformed about the expected 
return, but immediately declare the firm bankrupt if it defaults upon agreed payments.
An obviously important question is whether the investment being made in 
response to the removal of protection should be seen as a social benefit. In the case of 
the example discussed in Section VII the answer is that it can. That is the risk-averse 
owner/manager fails to make the investment, prior to the removal of the subsidy, 
because of the non-existence of the appropriate ‘insurance’ market. This failure to 
invest can be seen as an example of the under investment in risky enterprises problem 
discussed by Arrow (1962). By way of contrast, responding to the removal of 
protection by making a ‘long shot’ investment is, from an ex ante view point, socially 
undesirable. Consider the example of a ‘long shot’ investment shown in Section VI 
where g=0.1. Here the owner/manager is able to take a ‘one way bet’ because the 
creditor is unaware of the high probability of default. It is a case of the creditor 
mistakenly continuing to believe that the owner/manager’s aversion to bankruptcy would 
deter an application for a loan if the investment was a ‘bad risk’.
Finally, it is worth commenting upon any possible alternative applications for this 
analysis. One such application may be in industrial relations. Anecdotes about an 
increase in competitive pressure inducing firms to ‘confront’ unions might be explained 
in terms of the cost of the strike being interpreted as an investment with an uncertain 
outcome. The good outcome would consist of either a reduction in wages or improved 
work practices. The added complication with such an application would be the need to 
model union as well as managerial behaviour. Another application may be a contribution
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to the literature on whether recessions induce investment in new technology. The 
existing literature focuses on the idea that during a recession there is a lower opportunity 
cost connected with the disruption of current production necessary for the development 
or adoption of new technology11. A potentially important difference between a recession 
and the subsidy removal is that an output price reduction associated with a recession is 
temporary. However, given the difficulty in differentiating between structural and 
cyclical price reductions, recession-induced distress innovation seems to be an idea 
which is worth pursuing.
11. For an example of this work see Cooper and Haltiwanger (1990).
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CHAPTER 5: PRODUCT QUALITY AND PRO TECTION
I: Introduction
*
So far we have only examined how changing protection may affect the protected 
firm’s cost of production. In this chapter we consider how changing protection may 
affect the quality of the protected firm’s products. Consider the recent history of the 
Australian Automobile Industry which has been particularly well documented. Over the 
past few years the industry has received reduced levels of assistance and has appeared 
to narrow the quality gap between domestically produced and imported vehicles1. The 
non-economist would probably explain stylised facts such as these in terms of 
‘competitive pressure’. That is, with reduced protection the domestic firm is forced to 
increase product quality so as to mitigate the losses in sales resulting from the now 
lower-priced inputs. An obvious theoretical objection to such reasoning is that if 
increasing product quality leads to higher profits then surely this action would already 
have been taken independently of any reduction in protection. This chapter develops a 
simple model which shows how the removal of protection from an intermediate good 
can result in increased product quality without violation of the profit maximisation 
assumption.
The model is applicable to a vertically separated industry with the quality of the 
final good being dependent upon the quality of the intermediate goods (components) 
used in its production. Examples of intermediate goods which frequently receive
l . See Automotive Industry Authority (1990) and (1991), particularly Chapter 11 from 1991.
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protection include steel, textiles and motor vehicle components. The model consists of 
a single domestic producer of intermediate goods (the supplier) providing components 
for a single final goods producer (the assembler) which sells the finished good as a price 
taker on the world market. The removal of protection from the supplier gives the 
assembler greater bargaining power since the option of turning to a foreign supplier 
becomes more attractive. The single domestic supplier assumption is necessary to utilize 
a bilateral bargaining framework. The supplier could be thought of as a number of 
domestic suppliers behaving collusively. Assuming that the assembler is a price taker 
in the output market allows the analysis to focus upon the effect of the supplier- 
assembler relationship upon product quality. This differentiates the analysis from the 
literature which addresses how imperfect competition in the output market impacts upon 
quality. Spence (1975) and Sheshinski (1976) show that a monopoly can distort the 
provision of quality just as it distorts the quantity of output. In contrast, in the present 
analysis quality differs from its competitive level as a result of inefficient bargaining in 
the intermediate goods market. It is argued that an inefficient bargaining regime which 
is analogous to the ‘right-to-manage’ model from the union bargaining literature (see 
Ulph and Ulph (1988)) represents a plausible case which provides an intuitively 
appealing explanation why removing protection from suppliers can be expected to 
increase product quality.
Other studies which have touched on the question of changes in protection 
affecting product quality are concerned with imperfect competition in the output market. 
Donnenfeld, Weber and Ben-Zion (1985) consider the imposition of a minimum quality 
standard upon imports. In their model this policy measure implies negative protection 
and one result of it is that the domestic producer increases quality. The market structure
81
assumed is that of a domestic monopolist facing competition from a large number of 
foreign firms. The foreign firms are assumed to be unable to establish a reputation for 
product quality above some minimum level. This gives the single domestic firm its 
monopoly power. The imposition of a minimum quality standard upon imports raises 
the quality of imports above the previous minimum level. Consequently, sales of the 
imported good increase and sales of the domestically produced goods decrease. They 
show that the domestic firm increases quality so as to avoid the loss of buyers with a 
high willingness to pay for quality. Das and Donnenfeld (1989) consider the imposition 
of a quota on imports using a Coumot-Nash duopoly model with one domestic and one 
foreign firm. These firms compete in the domestic market where the consumers can 
perfectly observe quality at the time of purchase. Under certain circumstances reducing 
the quantity of imports by using a quota is shown to result in the domestic firm 
increasing output and decreasing quantity.
The chapter is organized in the following manner. Section II specifies the 
relationship between the supplier and the assembler. Section III shows how a change in 
intermediate goods protection can affect quality. First the case is shown where the 
parties bargain over a ‘basic price’ and a ‘quality premium’. This is followed by the case 
where only the quality premium is bargained over.
II: Introducing the Model
In this model the supplier produces x units of the component and then the 
assembler transforms these into x units of the finished product. The assembler does this 
using a composite input y which has a price per unit of w. To ensure a finite profit
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maximising quantity for the assembler the production function is assumed to exhibit 
decreasing returns to scale; x = x(y), X y  > 0, X y y  < 0. The price received for a unit of the 
finished product is a function of the quality (q) of the component embodied within it; 
P = P(q), Pq > 0, Pqq < 0. That is, it is assumed that the marginal valuation of quality 
declines. Think, for example, of quality being some index of reliability. Consumers 
regard products which are very unreliable as having a low value. However at higher, 
and hence more acceptable, levels of reliability, consumers place a relatively low value 
on a further increment of reliability. It is assumed that at any given level of quality, say 
q*, there are, on a world-wide basis, a sufficient number of sellers offering the product, 
at a quality of q \  for the market to be perfectly competitive.
The supplier’s cost of production is determined by both the level of quality at 
which the components are produced and the quantity of components produced; C = 
C(q, x). The only restrictions placed upon the cost function are Cq > 0, Cx > 0, Cqq > 0. 
Since the supplier does not set output in response to a competitive market price, it is not 
necessary to restrict its technology to decreasing returns to scale. Hence there is no 
problem in thinking of the possibility that the supplier’s technology is characterized by 
some economies of scale2. The restriction that the marginal cost of quality increases 
with quality seems a quite natural assumption. The idea is that it becomes increasingly 
costly to get closer and closer to the unobtainable limit of every single component being 
perfect. The supplier’s revenue received in payment from the assembler is some agreed 
function of the quantity and quality of the components which are supplied. That is in
2. If the assembler and supplier are thought of as a single firm then the Hessian determinant from the 
profit maximisation problem is 
H ■ - c „>■Kp - C,).V  - C^x,2] - [(P, -
Clearly for this to be positive it is necessary for |Cn | to be not too large.
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general terms supplier’s revenue (the contractual payment schedule for components) is 
defined as R = R(q, x). To summarize, profits for the assembler and supplier are 
respectively:-
n =  P(q).x(y) - R(q, x(y)) - w.y
2 = R(q, x(y)) - C(q, x(y))
Given that the assembler and supplier are in a bilateral relationship it is natural 
to assume that neither is in a position to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. That is, it is 
assumed they engage in a bargaining process. The standard assumption is made that this 
process results in a Nash bargaining equilibrium outcome. The form of bargaining used 
is known from the union bargaining literature as ‘right-to-manage’. Here it involves the 
assembler and supplier bargaining over a schedule of component prices for a range of 
possible quality levels and then the assembler deciding upon the required quality and 
quantity of the component. That is, in general terms, the price of a single component 
is some agreed function of quality, S = S(q), and hence the payment to the supplier is 
R(q, x) = S(q).x.
In the union bargaining literature, the standard objection to right-to-manage 
bargaining is it is inefficient. From the subsequent analysis it will become clear that the 
assembler’s profit-maximising choice of quantity to purchase will not, in general, 
coincide with the choice that will maximise the joint surplus. The obvious justification 
for working with this form of bargaining is that there are instances when it does appear 
to be taking place. The objection that the parties are not behaving optimally can be 
countered by arguing that there are unmodelled prohibitive transaction costs associated 
with so-called efficient bargaining. Nickell and Andrews (1983) argue in the union 
bargaining context that employers prefer to simply bargain with unions over wages and
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have the right to make continual adjustments to employment unilaterally. An analogous 
argument can be made with regard to components bargaining. That is an assembler may 
find it valuable to be able to adjust quality and quantity without incurring bargaining 
costs. As an example think of the case which has typified the automobile industry3. 
When the assembler requires a component for a new model it asks a number of potential 
suppliers to quote a price for an order specifying both quantity and quality. It is 
common for the assembler to enter into bilateral negotiations with an individual supplier 
to attempt to gain a lower price by using threats of turning to alternative suppliers. It 
is interesting to note in the case of this industry that something resembling efficient 
bargaining has typically been limited to Japan4. Here the supplier is asked to devise a 
cost-quality compromise for a new component taking into account demand for finished 
vehicle considerations. Presumably the long term relationship between Japanese 
suppliers and assemblers insures that the component cost-quality outcome leads to an 
‘acceptable’ level of profit for both the assembler and supplier.
Two bargaining frameworks are considered for the component price schedule:-
S = N + y.q (1)
S = y q (2)
In case (1) both a ‘basic price’ N and a ‘quality premium’ y are bargained over. In the 
next section it is shown that this results in the assembler ordering the efficient level of 
quality given the quantity of components ordered. The efficient level of quality is where
3. This method of organizing production is described as ‘mass production’ by Womack, Jones and Ross 
(1990). It refers to the practices developed in the US and generally used throughout the world with 
the exception of Japan.
4. Womack, Jones and Ross (1990) essentially conclude that the Japanese success is due to the adoption 
of what they term ‘lean production’. One aspect of lean production is the relationship between 
assemblers and suppliers.
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the marginal benefit of quality in terms of a higher price for the final good equals its 
marginal cost in terms of a higher average cost for producing the component. In case 
(2) only y is bargained over. The choice of quality in this case will in general not be 
efficient. However it may be that the parties prefer to only have to focus on a single 
variable when bargaining.
The respective payoffs from failure of the assembler and supplier to agree are 
assumed to be (rc0, 0). The assembler’s next best alternative to coming to agreement 
with the supplier is purchasing the component from a foreign supplier and receiving 
profits 7tc5. The removal of protection which the model is used to look at is any measure 
which results in it being less expensive for the assembler to fail to come to an agreement 
with the domestic supplier and instead turn to a foreign supplier. Hence the removal of 
the supplier’s protection is modelled by considering an increase in n0. An example of 
intermediate goods protection being removed is the recent abolition of the local content 
scheme used for protecting Australian automobile component suppliers6. These 
suppliers have largely continued to supply domestic assemblers. However, now a threat 
by an assembler to turn to a foreign supplier has gained credibility.
Ill: Removal of Protection
This section uses the model to show how the removal of protection can cause 
an improvement in product quality. The analysis is developed using the case where the
5. An alternative ‘prior to protection removal’ next-best-altemative would be the option of in-house 
production of the component with the assumption that the in-house production cost is greater than the 
production cost of the foreign supplier plus transport cost.
6 . See Automotive Industry Authority (1990) Chapter 9.
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parties bargain over N and y to determine the component price schedule. Following 
this, the analysis is used to examine the special case where bargaining is restricted to y. 
Prior to using the Nash product to engage in comparative statics it is necessary to 
determine how the assembler responds to changes in N and y. These responses are 
obtained from the first order conditions for the assembler’s profit maximisation problem:
7t(N,y)= Max [P(q).x(y)-(N+y.q).x(y)-w.y].
Let L = P(q).x(y)-(N+ y .q).x (y)-w .y .
The first order conditions for this problem are:
—  = P .x - y.x = 0 
aq q
(3)
dL—  = P.x - (N+y.q).x
ey y y
w = 0
=* (P-N-Y.q).xy = w (4)
(using (3)).
Also,
* n(N ,y) . —  - -x < 0
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71 (N,Y) * —  - -q.x < 0
3y
using the envelope theorem.
The solution to the Nash bargaining problem involves choosing y ,N  to maximise the 
Nash Product:
q - [ x ( y >N)- x J . [N.x(y(y,N)) * Y q(Y) x(y(Y,N)) - C(q(Y),x(y(y,N)))]. 
The first order conditions for this problem are:
( y x - C  )
q - -q.x.S + [x - 71 l.[q .x  ♦ q.b <■ ---------- 5- ] - 0 (5)T p
qq
-x.S  +  [ n
where b =
- 7t0] . [ x  t b] - 0
(N * Y-q - Cx).xy2 
(P-N-y.qXx^
(6)
These conditions imply that the condition for the efficient choice of quality is:
C
Y - —  
x
C
=> P q = —- (since from (3) the assembler’s first order condition for
x choosing quality is Pq = y )
It is instructive to compare the solution to this problem with the solution to the efficient 
bargaining problem. The latter is solved in Appendix 5.1 and yields the following 
condition for equilibrium quantity:
(P - Cx) .x y = w . (5.1.2)
Comparing this with (4), it is clear that right-to-manage bargaining results in an 
inefficient choice of quantity. This is explained as follows. The assembler chooses y
88
(and consequently x) such that the value of the marginal product of y equals its price w. 
Under right-to-manage bargaining the net value of producing an extra unit of the final 
product equals the physical marginal product of y times the price of the final product net 
of the cost of purchasing the component. This value will only equal the true resource 
cost of producing the component if the price of the component, which results from 
bargaining, happens to equal the supplier’s marginal cost of production.
Now totally differentiating (5) and (6) yields
- v .  v
■ ^ N n 0 ^N N * ^ N N  + T |Nn0 T1YN
d f l  A Ao
where a  > 0 is the Hessian determinant of the system.
(y.x - C )
T| = -[q.x + q.b + ------------ — ] (7)
-q.x.E
[ *  - « J
(using the condition r\ = 0 )
'1k,. ' -tx + bl
: . E
[*  -
(using the condition q N = 0 ).
Hence:







(P-N-y.q).x .Pv 1 yy qq
>  0 .












to be efficient y =
> 0 can be written as C < —- since for the quality outcome
qx x
So a supplier with a technology such that Cqx < 0 would
x
satisfy this condition.
Appendix 5.2 demonstrates that an increase in the assembler’s bargaining power 
changes the agreed y and N so that the profitability of producing a unit of final output 
at the margin is increased causing the profit maximising assembler to increase output and 
hence the quantity of the components ordered. If ‘economies of quality’ occur (Cqx< 
0) an order for a higher quantity will be accompanied by an order for a higher quality. 
A supplier technology which has decreasing marginal costs of quality with increased 
output seems plausible7. For instance think of a highly automated piece of capital 
equipment which if installed would result in it becoming cheaper to produce the 
component at a finer tolerance standard. The adoption of such capital equipment may 
require a relatively high output level to insure full capital utilization.
The preceding discussion of a technology which would imply Cqx < 0 can be
7. This statement is not meant to imply that the opposite case of ‘diseconomies of quality’ is in any way 
implausible.
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formalized using the following production functions: 
x = M(K, L) , q = G(K, I)
where:
Mk > 0 , Mkk < 0 , Ml > 0, Mll < 0, Mlk > 0;
GK > 0 , Gkk < 0 , Gj > 0 , Gn < 0 , GK > 0 .
Here the production function M specifies the number of components produced for a 
given combination of capital K and ‘fabrication’ labour L. The production function G 
specifies the level of quality at which the component is produced for a given combination 
of capital K and ‘inspection’ labour I. The obvious special feature of this technology is 
that capital is a joint input. A brief examination of the managerial-engineering quality 
control literature indicates that it is common for capital equipment used in fabricating 
products to also have a role in achieving the required level of quality8.
The other feature of this technology which is critical to the outcome of Cqx < 0 
is the assumption that G,* > 0. That is, it is assumed that the marginal product of the 
quality inspectors is increased as more capital is employed. So, since the amount of 
capital employed and the level of output are positively related, intuitively we would 
expect that the cost of increasing quality would be smaller at a higher level of output, 
that is Cqx < 0. This is confirmed in Appendix 5.3 along with Cq > 0, Cx > 0 and Cqq > 
0 which are the general restrictions which have been placed on the supplier’s cost 
function in this analysis.
8. Hansen (1963) describes such capital equipment as ‘tooling used as media of inspection’, page 266.
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When bargaining is restricted to y only, represented by price schedule (2), the 
problem collapses to that of choosing y  to maximise:
T| - [ J t ( Y ) - n J.[Y-q(Y) x(y(r)) - C(q(Y),x(y(Y»)].
The first order condition for this problem is
1 Y * -q.x.E - [ ti - 7i J . [q.x
(r-q -c„)-Xy 
( P -y q ) x ff
(YX-S1] . 0. (9)
Totally differentiating (9) yields:
dy = V  = q .x .E  < 
d7t r» [7t - n ] . r\o 1yy l o j  1yy




dv > 0. 
d7t o
The explanation for quality now unambiguously increasing is that y must decrease in 
order to reflect the improvement in the assembler’s bargaining position. The analogous 
case for a union bargaining right-to-manage model would be a change in bargaining 
positions resulting in a lower wage and hence the employer offering more employment. 
In the previous case y does not necessarily decrease, rather it adjusts so that the efficient 
choice of quality continues to be made. In the present case y has to decrease because 
N is not available to help reflect the improvement in the assembler’s bargaining position.
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IV: Concluding Comments
The objective of this chapter has been to show a reduction in protection may 
plausibly lead to an improvement in product quality. Both the assembler and supplier 
act to maximise their respective profits. Collective profit is not maximised because of 
the restrictions placed upon assembler-supplier bargaining as a result of unspecified 
transaction costs. This is broadly analogous to the standard case of the failure of 
monopoly to maximise social welfare when the monopolist is restricted to setting a 
single output price.
There seem to be two literature streams within which this chapter fits. Clearly 
it can be seen as a variant upon the literature where imperfect competition in the finished 
product market distorts the provision of product quality. Here the bilateral monopoly 
in the intermediate good market distorts the quality of the intermediate good and 
consequently the quality of the final good. From another perspective, the analysis sits 
comfortably with the disparate collection of literature on the effects of protection upon 
the performance of the protected firm9. A general theme running through the results 
from these analyses is that some imperfection or distortion is required for protection to 
adversely impact upon performance. There are two such imperfections upon which this 
analysis is reliant. The first is that the domestic market for the intermediate good is not 
perfectly competitive giving the supplier, or cartel of suppliers, some bargaining power. 
The second is the inability of the supplier and the assembler to bargain efficiently.
9. This comment refers to both the other analyses in this thesis and the related literature discussed in 
Chapter 2.
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APPENDIX 5.1: THE FIRST ORDER CONDITIONS FOR THE EFFICIENT 
PROVISION OF QUALITY AND QUANTITY.
This appendix first considers the case when the assembler and supplier merge. This 
establishes the efficiency conditions since the merged firm acts to maximise combined 
profits. The appendix then shows that these conditions are satisfied if y , q and y are all 
bargained over.
The Merged Firm Case
it - Max [P (q ) x (y ) - C (q ,x(y)) - w .y]. 
q.y
FOCs:
Pq.x - Cq - 0 (A5.1.1)
or P .x = C q q
P.xy - Cx.xy - w = 0 (A5.1.2)
or (P-Cx) .x y = w .
The Efficient Bargaining Case
11 = Max [P(q).x(y) - y.q.x(y) - w.y - * J . [ Y  q x(y ) - C (q,x(y))]. 
y.r.q
FOCs:
V [ P - V Y - q - V w ] . [ Y - q . x - C ] + [P x -Yqx-w .y-7 iJ . [Y .q .xy-C x.xy] = 0 (A5.1.3)
[Pq.x-Y.x].[Y.q x - C] ♦ [ P . x - y q *  -  w.y - 7iJ . [ y .x - Cq] = 0 (A5.1.4)
= -q.x. [ y .q .x -C ]  ♦ q .x [P .x-y .q .x  - w.y - 7ro] = 0 (A5.1.5)
=► [P x - Y-qx-w.y - o] = [y.q.x - C].
Substituting (A5.1.5) into (A5.1.4)
[P q.x - Y-x] = - tY-x - Cq]
=»■ P x - C = 0. q q Condition for the efficient choice of q.
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Substituting (A5.1.5) into (A5.1.3)
P.xy - Y-q xy - w - c x.xy - y.q.xy
=*• (P - Cx).xy = w. MRP=w condition for the choice of y.
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APPENDIX 5.2: COMPARATIVE STATICS FOR QUANTITY IN THE TWO 
PART COMPONENT PRICE CASE.
dyThe purpose of the appendix is to show —— > 0 which implies that a reduction in
dn O







is available from the text but dN
dn O
needs to be obtained:
dN
du O
x .e  *iTT - q - y
[it - n j  [ A








APPENDIX 5.3: AN EXAM PLE OF SUPPLIER TECHNOLOGY
This appendix uses the supplier’s cost minimisation problem to show that the technology 
discussed in Section V of the text is consistent with Cx > 0 , Cq > 0, Cqq > 0 and Cqx <
0.
C (r,w ,x ,q ) = Min [r.K + w .(L + I)]
K.L.I
Subject to: x = M(K, L)
q = G(K, I).












= r - - X2>Gj,
= w - A.r M L = 0 
- w - A.2G j = 0 
= x - M (K ,L ) = 0
- q - g(k,i) = o.
= o
a^£ as£
Since A.!=CX and X2=Cq it is clear f ro m ---- = 0 and ------= 0 respectively that Cx > 0
aL ai
and Cq > 0.
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Differentiating wrt q gives:
"A 1-N^kx - Aj .G j^ i -M k 0
-A. 0 0 0
< n 2 i
• c  • .
dq ”  5
- A j .G j^ 0 - ^ G n ■G, 0
-M K 0 0 0
-g k 0 -G, 0 -1
•4--[M a.(GrGn - M K'G n) ( M LKM L - M ll-M k)]-
H
Since H is positive, Cqq > 0.
Differentiating wrt x gives:
-(Aj.M^ + Aj .G .^ ) - Ai M kl -A2.G ki ■Mk 0
"A i-Mir 0 0 0
d * j  1c
O1 0 - A j .G jj -G, 0
dx ,x h
-M K -m l 0 0 -1
-G k 0 -G, 0 0
_ •  A, i .[A,2. M - A.2.M K.M L1/G n.G K 
H
- A.r G,J.M LL.G KK
+ Xj.G j.M j^ .G^j.G j,] .
2
Assuming strict concavity of M in (K, L) implies so that when M K
= M l = 0 the second order conditions for a maximum are fully satisfied.
It then follows from the signs of the derivatives of M and G that Cqx < 0.
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CHAPTER 6: PROTECTION AND W ORK PRACTICES
I: Introduction
In this chapter a reduction in protection is considered in the context of a 
unionized workforce. The question which is asked is; will a reduction in protection lead 
to an agreement with the union which results in less restrictions being placed on work 
practices? The analysis in this chapter suggests that it is quite plausible that this will be 
the case if the instrument of protection is an import quota. Easing quantitative import 
restrictions reduces the market power of the protected firm. Casual observation of the 
deregulation experience in transport and communication suggest that associated with a 
reduction in market power has been a willingness on the part of unions to accept the 
winding back of restrictive work practices1. In Chapter 2 various pieces of empirical 
evidence are presented which associate reductions in production cost with decreases in 
protection. Part of the reduction in production costs may be as a result of reforms to 
work practices.
The chapter uses the firm-union Nash bargaining framework. The firm is a 
domestic monopolist which faces import competition from a perfectly competitive world 
market. Since the firm receives protection in the form of a quota it has a degree of 
monopoly power in the domestic market. The firm’s employees are all represented by 
a single union. In Section II the firm and union bargain over wages and ‘effort’. In 
section III they bargain over wages and the labour/capital ratio. Both effort and the
l . For a discussion of this issue with respect to the aviation industry see Forsyth (1984).
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labour/capital ratio can be thought of as reflecting work practices. Effort parameters 
which may be bargained over include the length of the tea break, the maximum 
acceptable time to do certain standardized tasks and the range of unpleasant tasks which 
are regarded as acceptable for employees to undertake. The labour/capital ratio 
becomes a work practices issue when there is contention over the number of employees 
required to operate a particular piece of capital equipment.
Essentially what this chapter does is to take relatively recent developments in the 
union bargaining literature as a framework to address the issue of protection and work 
practices. The framework used is basically a development of the ‘right-to-manage’ 
approach discussed in the previous chapter. Effort or the labour/capital ratio is 
bargained over as well as wages. Andrews and Simmons (1995) in a review of the 
literature refer to this as the ‘joint wage-effort bargain’. Layard, Nickell and Jackman 
(1991) also make use of this bargaining framework. Their justification for restricting 
bargaining to wages and effort with employment unilaterally decided by firms is based 
on empirical work by Oswald (1987). Oswald surveys both US and British unions and 
finds that there are very few cases where bargaining over employment takes place. 
Examining the joint wage-effort bargaining literature allows us to identify two separate 
strands. The first strand consists of the literature which contrasts different bargaining 
regimes. Johnson (1990) contrasts efficient bargaining, semi-efficient bargaining and 
bargaining solely over wages. Johnson uses the term ‘semi-efficient’ to refer to 
bargaining over wages and effort and bargaining over wages and the labour/capital ratio. 
Bulkley (1992) contrasts the effort levels associated with competitive and unionized 
labour markets considering both the risk-neutral and risk-averse cases. The second 
strand in the literature focuses upon comparative static applications. Both Andrews and
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Simmons and Layard, Nickell and Jackman consider the effects of changes in union 
power and outside opportunities. Obviously the results of such analyses are highly 
relevant to understanding changes which occurred in the British economy over the 
1980s. Layard, Nickell and Jackman also show that in their model an increase in 
product market competition results in a reduction in effort. However their worker utility 
function is less general than the worker utility function used in the analysis presented in 
the next section. In Section II it is shown that an increase in an import quota (reducing 
the market power of the domestic firm) has an ambiguous effect upon effort. It is 
however argued that the case where an increase in the quota causes an increase in effort 
is highly plausible.
II: Joint Wage-Effort Bargaining
In this section a case is shown where reducing protection causes an increase in 
effort. The reduction in protection comes in the form of an increase of a quota on the 
volume of imports. Later it is shown that changing a tariff or a subsidy will not affect 
effort.
Following the standard approach used in the union bargaining literature 
efficiency units of labour are defined as
L=e.N.
N represents the number of homogenous workers employed all ‘working’ some standard 
number of hours, e is an effort scaling factor applied to N. That is a higher e may be 
thought of as being a reduction in the number of tea breaks meaning for a given N more 




That is one efficiency unit of labour is needed to produce one unit of output. Including 
capital in this case would not contribute anything to the analysis.
The union has the following utility function:
U = [4>(w,e)- 4>].N
<t>6< 0  , <!>„> o
i> < 0 ,  <b < 0 . <b < b - d>2 > 0.
Where: 4> is the utility which an individual member gains from being employed
by the firm.
<f> is the reservation utility which an individual member would receive if 
not employed by the firm. For simplicity <f> is set equal to zero.
The firm and the union engage in joint wage-effort bargaining. This involves the 
firm and the union bargaining over both wages and effort and then the firm unilaterally 
determining employment. From the previous chapter it should be clear that this form of 
bargaining is inefficient. Bargaining over the three variables w, e and N would give an 
efficient outcome. However in general it seems that employment is not a variable which 
is bargained over. A standard explanation for this (see Brown and Ashenfelter 1986 and 
Johnson 1990) is that for an agreement to be made about employment over a period of 
time it would be necessary to specify how employment would be adjusted in response 
to fluctuations in costs and demand. The problem with such an agreement is that the 
firm is likely to have better information than the union on fluctuations in costs and 
demand. That is the firm would have the opportunity to cheat the union. Hence the 
union would regard a ‘commitment’ by the firm to employ above the profit-maximising
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level as worthless.
To establish how effort changes in response to a change in the quota Q the first 
step is to establish the direct effect upon L of changes in e, w and Q. Demand for the 
output is assumed to be linear. The firm’s problem of selecting the profit maximising 
level of employment is
7i ( e , w) — Max 
L
L.{a-b . (Q  + L)} - w .—
e
Let II = L .{a -b . (Q  + L)} - w .— .
e
The first order condition for this problem is
an _ __ . w ^-----= a - b.Q - 2L .b------ = 0
ÖL e





K(e ,w ) .La: b-Q- y /e]!.
4b
The solution to the Nash bargaining problem involves choosing e and w to maximise the 
Nash product:
T| -  ß  ln 4>(e,w).—
e
+ ( l - ß ) . l n
[a- b.Q - w/e]'
where ß is the union bargaining power parameter, 0<ß<l. 
The first order conditions for this problem are
4> e 2 e 2.b.L
* ( 1 -  P)
e 2.[a- b.Q - w/e]
( 1)
4> i
P — - P . - - - - - - -
<J> 2e.b.L
- ( i  -  P)
e.[a- b.Q - w/e]
0 . (2)
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Multiplying (2) by w/e and then equating this with (1) yields
e.<t>c + w.4>w = 4>. (3)
This is exactly the same expression for the contract curve in wage-effort space that 
Andrews and Simmons (1995) derive. The slope of the contract curve is
Clearly it is ambiguous whether the contract curve is upward sloping or downward 
sloping. However it is interesting to note that Andrews and Simmons argue that the 
contract curve is, at least in the British case, upward sloping. That is, various pieces of 
evidence are presented indicating that, particularly over the early 1980s, higher wages 
have been conceded in return for a commitment to increase productivity (increased 
effort).
Using (1) and (2) a condition is derived for when an increase in the import quota 
results in an increase in effort.
Totally differentiating (1) and (2) yields
dw e-bcc*  w
(4)
^ e Q  ^ c w
de 1^ wQ ^  ww
dQ A
where A>0 is the Hessian determinant of the system.
W (2 -  P) 
e 4 e .b .L 2
( 2 - P)
4 e .b .L 2
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T| = ß.1 cw r
*^ew n ^ e '^ w ( 2 - P) w ( 2 - ß )
4» " P - 4>2 2 e 2.b.L 4 e 3.b 2 L 2
’Iw w *  ß
4> 4>2 ( 2 - ß )
*  py 4e 2.b 2.L 2
de ( 2 - p ) W
dQ 4 e . b .L 2 A
■ ' 1 ww ' 1 cwe
Now consider the sign of: 
w
----- .n - ri
1 w w  1 CW
e
p W<t>w (2 - b) .w p M .  ( 2 - p )  (2-
4>e <t>2.e 4 e 3. b 2. L 2 <i> 4>2 2 e 2.b.L 4 e 3
ß 2
' • [ _<*)ww <*> w +  W <t)w" b  4>e 4)w e - 4>w 4>]
<j)2.e
( 2 -  ß )  4 >
since from (2); --------- — = ß .■
2 e 2.b.L 4>e
•[ ' <l>ww <t> w * w -4>t- 4>„, 4>.<t * 4>w-4> - W-4>1- 4>w 4>]
since from (3); e.<f>e = 4> - w.<|>w.
if - 4> .w -  <J> .e > 0T ww ^  cw
then > 0. 
dQ
ß)  w  
.b 2 L 2
The obvious question to ask is how plausible is the condition 
[e.<|> ♦ w.<|> ] < 0 ? Andrews and Simmons show that if this condition holds then
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an increase in union power will result in reduced effort2. That is if the union is in a 
position to get a higher wage for a given effort the result of bargaining will be 
characterized by a reduced effort requirement. Since the idea of a powerful union 
achieving a variety of slack work practices for its members seems very plausible it is not 
unreasonable to assume in many cases that the condition [e.4>cw+ w < 0 holds.
It is instructive to now examine this comparative static result diagrammatically 
in e,w space. From (3) it is clear that the contract curve will not shift. Rather there will 
be a movement along it. To show the direction of this movement one of the first order 
conditions for the Nash bargaining problem is used. First order condition (2) is 
arbitrarily selected and following Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) is labelled the ‘Nash 
bargaining curve’ (NBC):
n w( e , w , Q )  = 0.  (NBC)
The NBC can be thought of as the relationship between the two parties’ rents which 
needs to hold for the Nash product to be maximised. To see this (2) can be rewritten 
as
1 *
< t> w e
(2a)
By substituting L= (a - b.Q - w /e)/2b into the inverse demand function we can now 
rewrite (2a) as
V 2p wD ---
e 2 - P
r
e
Here [cj>/e] represents the union’s rents per unit of output and [p - w/e] represents the
2. For details about their comparative statics see Andrews and Simmons (1993); the working paper 
version of their article.
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firm’s rents per unit of output. The slope of the NBC may be either positive or negative:
Here r i ^  needs to be negative for the second-order conditions to hold however the sign 
of ri^  is ambiguous. If 4>ew^ 0 then this is a sufficient condition for ^ > 0  and hence the 
NBC having a positive slope. It is simple to show that an increase in Q will cause a 
downward shift in the NBC in e,w space (irrespective of its slope):
NBC
4e.b.L 2




To be able to consider how this shift in the NBC affects effort it is necessary to consider 
the slope o f the NBC relative to the slope of the contract curve (CC). The contract
curve expression can be rewritten in a more general form:
w
—  T l . ' 0 - (3a)




(w/e).Ti + T1v J 1 ww 1 ew
Now defining the slope of the contract curve as Sc and the slope of the NBC as SN:
s  s  ^ w w ^ c c - ^ c w
r' w 4 ( W / e ) ' t l ww* 1
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Assuming r| is strictly concave in (e,w) allows us to say that the sign of Sc -SN will be
the same as the sign of
w
---- .T| + T|1 ww 1 cwe
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4> (j)2 e.<t> e.4> e .4>2
= — [e.4>cw+ w .4 )^ ]  using (3). 
e.<p
So if w.^ww] < 0 , the condition for de/dQ > 0 , then SN>Sc. Since we are
not in a position to place a sign on either SN or Sc there are three diagrammatic 
possibilities for representing how an increase in the quota causes an increase in effort. 
Figure 6.1 shows the case where SN is positive and Sc is negative. Figure 6.2 shows the 
case where both SN and Sc are negative but SN is less negative. Figure 6.3 shows the 
case where both SN and Sc are positive. In this latter case the increase in effort is 
accompanied by an increase in wages because the contract curve is upward sloping. A 
positive relationship between wages and effort would seem a particularly plausible case. 
It is interesting to note that from a qualitative view point it does not matter whether the 










It is interesting to analyse the welfare implications of an increase in Q. To do 
this, domestic welfare, in the presence of a quota3, is defined as
V (L ,Q ) = S (L + Q )-P .L -P .Q  (consumer surplus)






which can be rewritten as
V (L ,Q ) .  S(L+ Q) - P.Q - L — » L. ■<l>(w,e) (5)
e e
where P (L + Q ) = a -b .(L + Q )is th e  inverse demand curve,
S(L + Q) is the area under the inverse demand curve.
Differentiating (5) with respect to Q, and using the property that S '(L + Q ) = P (L + Q ),
yields
dV dL p ~ ü . + - Q .P '.
d (L .Q ) * L 'dw« v n * L de. w . 4>— + 4>c—
dQ dQ e e [ dQ j e dQ e dQ e e
Using (3) this can be rewritten as
dV dL p- * . + - Q .P '. 'd (L .Q ) * L .(< 0 „ - l) .d (w /e ) . (
dQ dQ e e dQ w dQ
The first term on the right-hand side of (6) represents how rents accruing to the 
domestic firm-cum-union will be affected by an increase in Q. The second term 
represents how domestic consumers will be affected by an increase in Q. The third term 
is a special term which only exists because this is an effort-bargaining model. It
3. It is assumed that any quota rents are reflected in foreign firm profits.
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represents how welfare is affected by the change in w/e (the change in the marginal cost 
of production) which is induced by an increase in Q. It is convenient to label this term 
the ‘X-efficiency effect’. Obviously to comment on the sign of this term we want to 
know the sign of d(w/e)/dQ. To do this we use the solutions for dw/dQ and de/dQ:
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This can now be rewritten with the expressions for and substituted in:
d(w/e)
- ---------- . { e 2.T| +w.e.Ti +w.e.r| + w 2 n } .
2 4  1 1 ec 1 we 1 ew 1 wwj (7)4b.L .e .A
The term within the {.} brackets is negative. This is because it is the quadratic form of 
the matrix given by A and for the second order conditions to hold A needs to be 
negative definite. Hence we can say that d(w/e)/dQ is negative. So what we have is
- « " t 1 - K]
Thus a decrease in (w/e), the ‘effective wage’, (and the firm’s marginal cost of 
production) will only increase welfare if the loss in utility from $1 less being paid in 
effective wages, 4>w, is less than the $1 gained by the firm. Hence we can say that it is 
quite possible that a reduction in protection, in the form of an increase in Q, can result 
in a X-efficiency welfare gain.
Now we turn to considering the signs of the first two right-hand side terms from 
(6). To do this we need to establish the signs of dL/dQ and d(L+Q)/dQ . Provided that
sgn L .(* .-  1).
d(w/e)
I l l
the assumption of strict concavity of 4> holds, it can be established that dL/dQ<0. To 
show this (2a) is rewritten as
L = A. where A = 2 -  ß 
2b.p  *
Differentiating this with respect to Q:
dL A Idw
dQ (e.<t> ) 2 |d Q
e  <t>w-  e  <t> <t>ww]* ~ - [ e - * w * « ‘  e - + - + « -
From (3) and (4) we can write
e -4>w 4) c -  4>w 4> = - W . + ; (3a)
e.d> + w.d>T  mi ■ t
w.d) + e.d>T ww t ew
(4a)
Using (3a) and (4a) we obtain:
d o ' ,  x ,2,A. — r ? d o - i 6 21*“ *2we<l >- * w * * 4dQ (e.<t>.)2.fw.4>ww. e.*„] dQ
Using reasonable assumptions about the individual worker’s utility function, 4>, we can 
say that the term in the {.} brackets on the right-hand side of (8) is positive. The 
assumption that [4>ww-4>ec- > 0 holds if <J) is strictly concave. This assumption
also implies that |e 2.4>cc+2w.e.<t)ew+ w 2.<t>ww < 0  since 4>’s quadratic form is negative 
definite. Hence
dL r ,  . i  uesgn------- sgnw.<J> ♦ e.<J> L—
dQ 1 r dQ
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and it has already been shown that
de
Therefore < 0 .
Now turning to consider the sign of d(L+Q)/dQ we can note that
L Q a - ( w / e) Q 
2b 2
Differentiating this with respect to Q gives
d(L,Q) , J _  d(w/e) ^ >Q since d(w/e) < Q
dQ 2b dQ 2 dQ
This is, o f course, what is to be expected. An increase in the quota causes the total 
domestic sales of the good to increase.
The first and second terms on the right-hand side of (6) can now be seen to be 








> 0 ( 10)
(9) represents the decrease in home firm-cum-union rents that results from an increase 
in Q. (10) represents the increase in consumer welfare that results from an increase in 
Q. The consumers benefit both from a greater volume of sales and a lower price. 
Together, (9) and (10) give the quite standard story as to the distributional effects of 
trade liberalization.
Finally in this section it is shown that protection in the form of either a tariff or 
a subsidy will not affect effort in this model. A change in a tariff or a subsidy, while
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affecting the price which the firm receives, does not affect the price elasticity of demand. 
Using the small country assumption, the demand for the firm’s output remains infinitely 
elastic. This contrasts with the quota case where an increase in the quota shifts the 
firm’s downward sloping demand curve inwards so at any given price the elasticity of 
demand increases.
To consider a protection policy change which only affects price and leaves the 
price elasticity of demand unchanged at infinity, the model needs to be slightly modified. 
That is, for the profit-maximising output to be finite it is necessary to have diseconomies 
of scale since the firm is now a price taker. To achieve this, a Cobb-Douglas production 
function is used:
x = L a.K 6 where a + 6 < 1.
Hence the firm’s profit maximisation problem, following the determination of e and w, 
becomes
7t (w , e) = Max
L.K.
p.L “ K 6 - w.— - r.K 
e
Let n = p.L“.K*- w.— - r.K.
e
The first order conditions for this problem are
—  = p.a .L“-1.K6 - — = 0 
dL e
p.6.L“.K&l - r = 0.
( ID
( 12)
Taking the total derivatives of (11) and (12) with respect to w and then solving 
simultaneously for Lw and Kw gives
e.a.p.La'2.K s. [ l - (a* f i ) ]
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e.p.L “ '.K *'*.[ 1 - (a * 6)]
Taking the total derivatives of (11) and (12) with respect to e and then solving
simultaneously for Le and Ke gives
Lo_________ - w-<5 - —.L
e 2.p.a.L“-2.K 8.[1 - (a ♦ fi)] e
K ____________ w___________  w K
e 2.p.L “_1.K *"*.[ 1 - (a * 6)] e w
Taking the total derivatives of (11) and (12) with respect to p and then solving 
simultaneously for Lp and Kp gives
L =---------- --------
P P [ 1 - (a * 6)]
K K
" p [ 1 - (a * 8)]
We can now show that the derivatives with respect to p of the first-order conditions for 
the Nash bargaining product, r |ep and ri^ , are equal to zero.
Following some manipulation ri^, can be written as follows:
(1- P) w.L------ 1  w k . r.K.p.(a* fi).La.K t
P e 2 n 2.p.[ 1 - (a + &)] [ e
e 2.n 2 p.[ 1 - (a + 6)]
(1 - p).w.L------ , j )  l  « k  * - a .p.L “.K 8 - 6 .p.L °.K *}
using (11) and (12)
0 .
r i^  is also equal to zero since it is straightforward to show that = - (w/e).ti . So
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it is clear that the NBC will not be affected by a change in price:
0 .
NBC
Hence e and w are not affected by the price the firm receives for its output and so are 
not affected by a tariff on imports.
Ill: Joint Wage-Lahour/Capital Ratio Bargaining
In one sense, bargaining over effort, as done in the previous section, can be seen 
as indirectly bargaining over employment. That is, for a given output, a reduced effort 
level implies a higher number of employees. Thus taking a longer tea break not only 
reduces the disutility of work for the individual union member but also potentially 
contributes to union utility because the number of employed union members would be 
increased for a given level of output. Johnson (1990) explores this concept of indirect 
employment bargaining by considering the concept of labour/capital ratio bargaining as 
well as intensity of work (effort) bargaining. Like effort bargaining, bargaining over the 
labour/capital ratio can be thought of as bargaining over work practices. That is the 
issue of how many employees are required to operate a particular piece of equipment is 
frequently a work practices issue which employers and unions bargain over.
In this section it is shown that, when the two variables which are bargained over 
are wages and the labour/capital ratio, an increase in the import quota decreases the 
labour/capital ratio. The labour/capital ratio is defined as z = The union’s utility 
function is just the same as in the previous section except that effort is no longer 
included:
U  = <f>(w).N = <f>(w).z.K •
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The firm’s production function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale: 
x - K ‘“ .N “
- K.z “ , 0 < a < 1.
The first step is to consider how, for a given z and w, the firm decides upon the profit 
maximising K (and hence N):
7i (z,w) = Max [K.z “.{ a - b.(Q + K.z “)} - w.z.K - r.K].
K
Let H = K.z “.{a - b.(Q*K.z“)} - w.z.K - r.K.
The first order condition for the problem is
3 T T
---- = z a - b.(Q + K.z “)} - b.K.z 2 a  -  w.z - r = 0
=» K z “.[a -b.Q ] - w.z - r 
2b.z2“
2b.z
, where y = z “.[a-b.Q ] - w.z - r,
=*> 71
4b.z
The solution to the Nash bargaining problem involves choosing z and w to maximise the 
Nash product:
tj = ß.ln[4>(w).z.K(z,w)] + (1 - p).ln7t(z,w).
The first order conditions for this problem are:
 ^ P - 2 •“ ,  L ( 2 -  ß) = 0 (13)




Totally differentiating (13) and (14) yields
dz
dQ A
where A>0 is the Hessian determinant of the system.
T) zw
(2  - ß ) (V 2 z - Y)
n . p . - ^ -  ß ,.^- 2*1?
™  4> 4.2 Y2
( 2 -  ß ).b .z  Y2 z ■ « Y)
’U -------------------- -----------------
Y






( 2 -  ß).b.z-'.(Y2.z- a . y )
Y 2
using both conditions (13) and (14).
(15)
To determine the sign of ( y z.z - a .y )  condition (13) can be rewritten as 
( 2 -  ß).(z.Yz - Y) * - 2 ( 1  - 
=> z.yz - y < 0.
Again (13) can be rewritten this time as 
2 ( z.yz - o .y)
= z -y2- Y-
ß
So:
Z YZ * Y < 0 
=> z .y z - a .y < 0 .
So from (15):
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What this result is saying is that if protection is reduced by increasing the volume of a 
quota applied to imports, the agreed number of employees required to operate a 
particular piece of capital equipment would be reduced. It is a result which is essentially 
driven by the form of bargaining which is used. Bargaining over w and z while leaving 
K (and hence employment N and output x) to be unilaterally determined by the firm is 
not fully efficient. That is, the bargaining does not achieve a result where joint surplus 
is maximised. A simple example of where joint surplus is maximised is the competitive 
labour market case. Here each identical worker is prepared to work for a wage which 
equals the participation constraint. Clearly in this situation the firm gets all the surplus 
which it maximises by choosing the optimal quantity of K and N to use. In Appendix 
6.1 this profit maximisation problem is written in terms of K and z. It is shown that 
changing Q has no effect upon the choice of z in this case. Now in the case where w and 
z are bargained over, N is determined by the firm acting to maximise its own profit 
rather than joint surplus. This is understood by both parties when bargaining over w and 
z. Agreeing to adjusting z has implications for the agreed w and the value of N decided 
by the firm. An increase in Q means that the total surplus to be bargained over is 
reduced. The union is prepared to agree to a reduced z so as to get the utility 
maximising w and N given the bargaining position which it finds itself in.
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IV: Concluding Comments
To conclude, it is useful to consider other approaches to questions of protection 
and the relationship between firms and unions. The political economy of protection 
literature characterizes the firm and the union as a coalition which lobbies a politically 
self-interested policy maker for protection. To achieve greater lobbying power it may 
be in the interest of this coalition for the firm to increase employment if this expands the 
number of individuals in the union (see Hillman 1989). Obviously if there were relatively 
unambiguous results with respect to the effect of lobbying upon work practices these 
would be of considerable interest.
An entirely different approach would be to consider the effect of increased 
‘competitive pressure’ upon the management decision as to whether to ‘confront’ the 
union over a work practices issue. That is using a decision-theoretic framework, similar 
to that used in Chapter 4, the cost of confronting the union could be interpreted as an 
investment with an uncertain outcome. The cost of eliminating a restrictive work 
practice might be a strike with the benefit being reduced costs where the actual extent 
of the reductions are stochastic. The decision to take the risk of eliminating such a work 
practice may be made more likely by the removal of protection. This is because without 
protection the firm may cease to exist if its production costs can not be reduced. Clearly 
such an approach would be very different to the axiomatic bargaining approach taken 
in this chapter. The bargaining model is cooperative. That is while the firm and the 
union may threaten each other with strikes and lockouts these threats are not actually 
carried out. Rather it is assumed that these two parties are well informed about each
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other and so can come to an agreement based upon the relative bargaining strengths.
Another approach, again based on Chapter 4, may be to take into account the 
union’s aversion to the firm, and hence the domestic industry, ceasing to exist. In an 
unprotected environment the union may recognise that if the firm fails to maintain 
international ‘best practice’ then there is a high probability that in the future the firm will 
be terminated. This recognition would tend to dissuade the union from advocating the 
continuation of work practices which prove to be inimical to the adoption of best 
practice techniques.
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APPENDIX 6.1: THE COMPETITIVE LABOUR MARKET CASE
Here with both competitive capital and labour markets the firm's problem is to select the 
profit maximising amounts of labour and capital to employ. However it is analytically 
convenient to write this problem in terms of choosing z and K. This allows us to use the 
first order conditions to show that —  = 0 in this case.
dQ
n (w,r,Q) = Max [K.z “.{ a - b.(Q + K.z “)} - w.z.K - r.K].
z.K
Let II = K.z “.{a - b.(Q + K.z “)} - w.z.K - r.K.
The first order conditions are
—  = a.(a - b . Q V K . z - 2a.b.K2.z 2“ 1 - w.K » 0 (6.1.1)
dz
P)TT
---- = (a - b.Q).z ° - 2b.K.z2“ - w.z - r = 0 . (6.1.2)
dK
Totally differentiating (6.1.1) and (6.1.2) yields
dz
dQ
(where A>0 is the Hessian determinant of the system)
A
» - . [ ( a -  b.Q).b.z2“ '-  2 a .b 2.Kz 3“-‘ - w.b.z “].
A
Now from (6.1.1)
( a -  b.Q).b.z2“ ' = 2 a .b 2.Kz 3“ ‘ . w.b.z“ 
dz
hence -----= 0 .
dQ
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CHAPTER 7: PROTECTION AND ENTRY DETERRENCE
I: Introduction
In Chapters 3 and 4 the protected firm is a local monopolist which can take 
action to affect its costs. In this chapter the protected local monopolist’s marginal cost 
is treated as exogenous. However there is the possibility that another domestic firm will 
enter the industry and be able to operate at a lower marginal cost. The idea here is that 
an existing firm’s history may prevent it from operating at a cost which is as low as the 
cost of a new firm. For example it may be prohibitively costly to eliminate work 
practices that are no longer appropriate due to newly available technology. Similarly it 
may have become appropriate to shift away from in-house production of certain 
intermediate inputs. Here the firm’s managers may not have the organisational ability 
to successfully make this shift. One of the best documented accounts of new firms 
operating in a more technically efficient manner is the rise of the so-called mini-mills in 
the US steel industry1. This chapter examines what circumstances are necessary for a 
reduction in protection to facilitate entry by a new domestic firm. That is, this chapter 
examines whether a case can be found where a reduction in protection makes the 
incumbent firm less likely to take action to prevent entry by other firms.
There are two well known approaches to modelling how an incumbent 
monopolist reacts to the expectation that another firm may enter causing the market
l . Barnett and Crandall (1986) document the emergence in recent years of small scale seel mills. These 
mills use the latest technology and do not suffer from the restrictive work practices which are 
prevalent within the large and long established steel companies.
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structure to become a duopoly2. The first of these approaches involves the incumbent 
being able to commit to a post-entry level of output by investment in productive 
capacity. The second approach involves assuming the entrant has incomplete 
information about the incumbent allowing the incumbent to engage in behaviour which 
is aimed at convincing the entrant that the expected profits from entry would not be 
positive. The development of both of these approaches was motivated by a desire to 
provide sound theoretic justifications for the contention that monopolies may engage in 
‘limit pricing’. Limit pricing consists of a monopoly charging a price below the profit 
maximising monopoly price so as to discourage entry. This idea at least goes back to 
Kaldor (1935) and had become part of the mainstream by the 1950s with leading authors 
such as Bain (1949) having a major role in its development. The problem with this idea 
is that there needs to be some justification for why a rational entrant would believe that 
the pre-entry settings of price and output would serve as indicators of post-entry 
profitability. With the increased use of non-cooperative game theory in economics the 
limit-pricing strategy as characterised by Bain and his contemporaries came to be seen 
as a non-credible threat. Friedman (1979) shows formally that the traditional limit 
pricing story does not represent a game-theoretic equilibrium. The capacity commitment 
and incomplete information approaches to the issue of entry deterrence has saved the 
term ‘limit pricing’ from being confined to text books on the history of economic
2. In this chapter even if entry does take place the firm which did have the monopoly position is known 




This chapter examines the effect of the change in protection upon entry 
deterrence using both of the above approaches. The chief aim of the analysis is to see 
how a case may arise where the incumbent initially deliberately acts to deter entry and 
then following a reduction in protection the incumbent accommodates entry (that is, acts 
to maximise profit given the entrant is going to enter). Hence the focus of the chapter 
is upon the protected incumbent’s choice between deterrence and accommodation. 
After a moment’s thought it should be clear that it is by no means intuitively obvious 
whether a decrease in protection will push the incumbent toward deterrence or 
accommodation. This is because we can identify two competing tendencies:
(i) Reducing protection leads to the reward from remaining a monopolist being 
diminished. That is, the incentive to engage in behaviour designed to deter entry 
has been reduced.
(ii) Reducing protection leads to the reward from entering the industry being 
diminished. Hence with reduced incentive to enter the industry the incumbent 
finds it easier to deter entry.
The following analysis shows that the effect of reducing protection is not quite as 
ambiguous as may initially be thought. In Section II a simple model based upon the 
ability to use capacity to commit to post-entry behaviour is used. Here a reduction in 
protection will definitely not facilitate entry by a domestic firm. Instead it is an increase 
in protection which may induce the incumbent to shift from deterrence to
3. It should be noted that it is generally acceptable to talk about limit pricing in the context o f a 
dominant firm discouraging entry of a ‘competitive fringe’. That is, discouraging entry by firms 
which are so small that they regard price as being parametric. Scherer and Ross (1990) discuss limit 
pricing in this context. It is a model applicable to situations where the dominant firm has an 
advantage in either cost competitiveness or appeal to buyers.
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accommodation. However this result is reversed if the entrant is in fact a foreign firm 
which is advantaged by a reduction in protection. Section III uses a Milgrom and 
Roberts type model to illustrate a case where reducing protection does cause the 
incumbent to shift from deterrence to accommodation of a domestic entrant. This is 
because reducing protection reduces the incumbent’s motivation to remain a monopolist 
to a greater extent than it reduces the cost of deterring entry.
II: Protection and Entry Deterrence with a Spence-Dixit Type Model4
The model used in this section relies upon the incumbent’s ability to commit to 
a particular post-entry productive capacity to provide a theoretic justification for the 
contention that incumbent firms may limit price to deter entry. The model has two 
periods. In the first period the incumbent is a monopolist. In the second period the 
entrant will enter the industry if it can make a positive profit by doing so. The two firms 
act sequentially with the incumbent being the leader and the entrant being the follower. 
In the first period the incumbent decides upon how much productive capacity to invest 
in. This commits the incumbent to producing this level of output in the second period. 
The justification for treating second period output as being synonymous with the 
investment in capacity is that the second period marginal cost of producing up to the 
productive capacity is relatively low5. The literature in this area shows that in general,
4. Tirole (1988 Ch.8) uses the label ‘Spence-Dixit’ for a basic entry deterrence model based upon the 
work of both Spence (1977, 1979) and Dixit (1979, 1980).
5. See Dixit (1980).
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once an investment has been sunk in productive capacity, this capacity will be used6. 
The entrant observes the incumbent’s choice of capacity and then makes its own 
capacity/output choice. Obviously a choice of zero capacity is synonymous with the 
entrant choosing not to enter the industry. If the incumbent sets its capacity sufficiently 
high the entrant will not enter since doing so would not yield a positive profit.
For a given set of parameters there are three possible outcomes. Entry may be 
blockaded, deterred or accommodated7. If entry is blockaded, the incumbent acts as a 
conventional profit-maximising monopolist but even so the entrant decides not to enter. 
If entry is deterred the incumbent deters entry by committing to a larger output than 
would maximise profit if there were no threat of entry. Thus the incumbent can be said 
to be limit pricing since if the entrant did not exist the incumbent would be charging a 
higher price. If entry is accommodated, the incumbent acts like a conventional 
Stackelberg leader committing to an output which maximises profit given the reaction 
of the entrant. This contrasts with deterring entry where the incumbent needs to commit 
to an output which would result in zero or negative profit for the entrant if entry took 
place. The smaller the entrant’s fixed costs, the higher the capacity commitment needed 
to deter entry. Hence the smaller the entrant’s fixed costs, the more likely it is profit- 
maximising to choose to accommodate entry rather than deter entry.
The form of protection considered here is a quota on the volume of imports. The 
effect of changing protection on the likelihood that an incumbent will accommodate an 
entrant may initially seem surprising. Accommodation of the entrant is unambiguously 
made more likely by an increase in protection. Reducing the volume of imports reserves
6. For a good review of this literature see Gilbert (1989).
7. This classification of possible forms of behaviour by incumbents is due to Bain (1956).
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more demand for the domestic firms. With greater demand the significance of the 
entrant’s fixed costs is reduced. It is a standard result from the Spence-Dixit model that 
if the entrant’s fixed costs are sufficiently low the incumbent will choose accommodation 
over deterrence. This is because the cost of deterrence in terms of setting output above 
the accommodation level overwhelms the benefit of deterring entry.
The domestic inverse demand function and the cost function are respectively:
p = a - b.(Q * K, ♦ Kg)
c CjK,
CE(KE) = f . c E.KE
where Q is the allowed volume of imports,
Kj and KE are the respective productive capacities of the incumbent and the 
entrant,
ct and cE are the respective marginal costs of the incumbent and the entrant with 
Ci>CE ,
f is the entrant’s fixed cost.
If entry is blockaded then the incumbent’s monopoly capacity and profit are:
a - b.Q - Cj
711 =
(a - b.Q - c,):
If the incumbent acts to deter entry or chooses to accommodate it, the incumbent needs
to take into consideration the entrant’s reaction function:
a - b.Q - cF Kt
K „ -----------------—  i f * „ > 0 ,
Ke - 0  if s 0.
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To deter entry the incumbent sets Kr so that the entrant will respond by setting KE=0. 
That is K, is set so tie=0:
- f = 0
a-b.Q - c£ [ K ’ l a-b.Q - c £ Kj
2b J + u. 2 J C E 2b 2a-b.Q -b.Kj-b.
Solving this gives the entry deterring capacity:
vd a - b . Q - cE- 2v/b7 
1 -------------- b '
The incumbent’s profit associated with the entry deterrence strategy is:
D 1
b* 1
CE -  c,+ 2v/bTfj.[a-b.Q - cg- 2 ^ ]
If the incumbent decides against entry deterrence, the profit maximisation problem 
becomes:
Max n a-b.Q -b.Kj-b.




2b J u . < 2 > _CI
This is simply the standard problem faced by a Stackelberg leader. That is is chosen 
so as to maximise profit taking into account how the entrant will react to this choice. 
From the first order condition the capacity associated with accommodation is:
__ a a - b.Q * cE- 2C[
The entrant’s reaction to K,A is:
a - b.Q - 3 ce + 2Cj
4b
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With these choices of capacity the incumbent’s profit is:
“ •[(a ■ b.Q - c,) * ( c E- c,)]2.
Figure 7.1 represents how tCjM, n®,  and tt,a change as Q is increased (that is as 
protection is reduced). The broken line shows the envelope of these curves and 
indicates where entry is respectively blockaded, deterred and accommodated. While 
appropriate parameter values are required for all three cases to be possible, there is a 
general tendency as the quota is reduced for the incumbent to shift from acting to deter 
entry (or having entry blockaded) to acting to accommodate entry. The first step in 
understanding this diagram is to note the signs of the first and second derivatives:
d7il* - (a  - b.Q - c.)
------  = -------------------- — < 0 provided K ,M > 0 ,
dQ 2
provided 7i J3 > 0 ,
drcA - ( a  -b.Q  - 2c, + c ) 
-------------------- ----- — < 0
dQ 4
provided K ,A > 0 ,
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For any given value of Q, n™ will be higher than n f .  This is illustrated using 
a standard diagram in Kt, KE space (Figure 7.2). The monopolist sets Kr in the 
knowledge that Kg will always equal zero. The accommodating incumbent sets Kr in the 
knowledge that Kg will be set according to the entrant’s reaction function. From Figure 
7.2 it can be seen that the isoprofit curve associated with monopoly represents a higher 
profit level than the isoprofit curve associated with accommodation. Accommodating 
entry obviously means that the incumbent has to share the market with the entrant. The 
entrant’s output pushes the price down and thus pushes down the incumbent’s profit.
With appropriate parameter values there will be a value of Q; Q* where tc,m = tc1d  
(see Figure 7.1). To examine this special case consider Figure 7.3. Here KrM coincides 
with where the entrant’s reaction function coincides with the Kj axis, that is KrD. To 
deter entry at Q* the incumbent simply needs to act like a conventional profit- 
maximising monopolist. If Q>Q* the incumbent does not need to set capacity equal to 
K °  since with the incumbent acting like a conventional profit maximising monopolist 
the entrant will choose not to enter. To see this, consider what happens to the profit the 
entrant would make from entering if Q increased above Q*:
d * E d * E  9 * e  dXi“  _bK
dQ 3Q * 3Kj dQ 2 E
Here KE will be set equal to the capacity that the entrant would choose if the entrant 
chose to enter where Kr was set equal to K,M. Hence:
Since at Q* , 7Ie=0 , at Q>Q* we must have 7tE<0. Thus we can say that if Q>Q* then
132
Figure 7.2: Accommodation and Monopoly
K,
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Figure 7.3: When Monopoly and Deterrence Profits are Equal
Kb
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entry is blockaded. Similarly if Q<Q*, then the strategy of acting like a conventional 
monopolist is inappropriate and so the incumbent has to choose between deterring entry 
or accommodating it.
In Figure 7.1 if Q is reduced below Q** the incumbent will choose to 
accommodate rather than deter entry since tt IA> 7 x ID. To understand what is causing this 
result consider Figure 7.4 which shows a reduction in Q from Q0 to When Q=Q0, 
entry deterrence is chosen since tiid(Q0)>7xia(Q0). When Q=Ql5 entry accommodation 
is chosen since 7tIA(Q1)>7tID(Q1). What is important to note from this diagram is the 
changing ratio between where the reaction function of the entrant is discontinuous, KjD, 
and where the entrant’s reaction function would intersect the K, axis if there were no 
fixed costs (denoted as K,E). Considering this ratio analytically we have:
K,e ; . ( a - b . Q - c E)
Now consider how7 a change in Q affects R:
8R - 2 y O  
dQ (a - b.Q - c ^ 2
So both from this and the diagram we can see that, as the entrant’s reaction function 
shifts out in response to a decrease in Q, the relative gap between KjD and K E is reduced. 
That is the relative importance of the entrant’s fixed costs, f, is reduced. If fixed costs 
are of minimal importance then it should be clear that the problem comes to resemble 
the standard Stackelberg story where the incumbent maximises profit by accommodating 
entry. The Spence-Dixit model requires the entrant’s fixed costs to be of some 
importance for the incumbent to deter entry.
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Figure 7.4: When Q Decreases so that Deterrence changes to Accommodation
(Qo - Q.)
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This model also proves useful for analysing the case where a domestic incumbent 
faces the threat of a foreign entrant moving into the domestic market. In this case it is 
supposed that the protective instrument is a tariff placed upon any goods sold by the 
entrant. In analytical terms a decrease in the tariff is equivalent to a decrease in cE, the 
entrant’s marginal cost. Figure 7.5 represents how n™, n®,  and n * change as cE is 
increased (that is as protection is increased). The broken line shows where entry is 
respectively blockaded, deterred and accommodated. While appropriate parameter 
values are required for all three cases to be possible, there is a general tendency as the 
tariff is reduced for the incumbent to shift from acting to deter entry (or having entry 
blockaded) to acting to accommodate entry. As with Figure 7.1 it is useful to begin by 
noting the signs of the relevant first and second derivatives:





> 0 if CE<
a + c




A 2TTD a j
- -  < 0
b
a + cE- 2Cj
> 0 provided Kj > 0
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Figure 7.5: Profit as a Function of cE
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j  2 A a n j
The level of protection where tcim = tcid  is at cE*. To confirm, that cE* is at the turning 
point of the tc,d curve, c£= (1 /2b ).[a  + Cj- 4^bT ] is substituted into tx,d :
D ,  •  v
* i ( Ce )
(a - c,):
With the appropriate parameter values there will be a level of protection, cE**, below 
which the profit from accommodation exceeds that from entry deterrence. To 
understand the intuition for the result that trade liberalization can facilitate the entry of 
a foreign firm consider Figure 7.6 which shows a reduction in cE from cE° to cE\  When 
cE=cE° entry deterrence is chosen since 7tID(cE°)>7tIA(cE°). When c^ e1 entry 
accommodation is chosen since 7tIA(cE1)>7xID(cE1). In this case it is a reduction in 
protection that causes the entrant’s fixed costs to become less important. This can be 
confirmed by showing R is increased when cE is reduced:
3R -2y/b 1  <0
dCE U - C E) 2
To summarise this section, the analysis represents an application of the standard 
Spence-Dixit model result that, the greater the relative importance of the entrant’s fixed 
costs, the more likely the incumbent will choose to deter entry. If the entrant is a 
domestic firm and protection is decreased (in the form of an import quota being 
increased) then the incumbent is more likely to choose to deter entry since the relative
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Figure 7.6: A Decrease in cE so that Deterrence changes to Accommodation
Ki
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importance of the entrant’s fixed costs have been increased. If the entrant is a foreign 
firm and protection is decreased (in the form of a tariff being decreased) then the 
incumbent is more likely to choose to accommodate entry since the relative importance 
of the entrant’s fixed costs have been decreased.
Ill: Protection and Entry Deterrence with Incomplete Information
In their seminal paper on entry deterrence Milgrom and Roberts (1982) 
demonstrate how incomplete information can be used to justify the notion that an 
incumbent may be able to deter entry by engaging in limit pricing. Consider a full 
information case to begin with. In period 1 a potential entrant observes both demand 
and the incumbent monopolist’s cost function. In period 2 the entrant enters if it is able 
to make nonnegative profits in a Cournot type duopoly with the incumbent. Now 
suppose that the entrant in period 1 is unable to observe whether the incumbent is ‘high- 
cost’ or ‘low-cost’. If the incumbent is high-cost then entering in period 2 would result 
in the entrant making positive profits. However if the incumbent is low-cost then 
entering in period 2 would result in the entrant making negative profits. An incumbent 
which is in fact high-cost may set its first-period price as if it were low-cost. That is, it 
may set price below the standard profit-maximising monopoly price. Hence it can be 
said that limit pricing may occur. The entrant will be deterred from entering if, from its 
prior beliefs, it considers the probability of the incumbent being high-cost to be below 
a critical level. This critical level is the probability which, if used to calculate expected 
second-period profit, will yield an outcome equal to zero.
In this section a Milgrom and Roberts type model is used to illustrate how
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reducing protection can facilitate entry8. The protective instrument is a quota on the 
volume of imports. The first equilibrium considered is devised so that a high-cost 
incumbent will deter an entrant (assumed to have lower costs) from entering by setting 
its first period price as if it were a low-cost incumbent. A second equilibrium is 
considered where the only change in the parameters used is an increase in the volume 
o f imports. This results in it no longer being profit-maximising for the incumbent to 
replicate the behaviour of a low-cost incumbent in the first period. That is the sacrifice 
in first-period profits is no longer worth the gain in second-period profits from remaining 
a monopolist. The reason why this can happen is that the reduction in protection causes 
a greater fall in profit for the incumbent when being a monopolist than when being a 
Cournot duopolist.
The domestic inverse demand function and respective cost functions are as 
follows:
p = a - b.(Q * x , .  x £)
C]H(X[H) = f  + CjH.x,H (The high-cost incumbent.)
(The low-cost incumbent.)
^+ ce*xe (The entrant.)
Where c ^ , crL and cE are the respective marginal costs of the high-cost
incumbent, the low-cost incumbent and the entrant;
8. This numerical illustration represents a modification of a numerical illustration used by 
Kreps (1990 Ch.13) to introduce the basic idea of the Milgrom and Roberts analysis.
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x,H, XjL and xE are the respective levels of output which would be set by 
the high cost-incumbent, the low-cost incumbent and the entrant;
X! is the incumbent’s level of output irrespective of whether the 
incumbent happens to be high-cost or low-cost.
The parameter values are as follows:
a = 9, b = 1, Q = 0, f = 2, c "  = 3.5, CjL= 1, cE =3.
There are two more parameter values which need to be set:
6 =0.35 The rate at which second-period profits need to be discounted 
for comparison with first-period profits.
p = 0.05 The entrant’s prior belief as to the probability of the incumbent 
being high-cost.
Obviously the future is discounted very heavily. This is necessary since once protection 
is reduced the aim is to show a situation where the period 1 benefits of not deterring 
entry outweigh, in present value terms, period 2 costs of not having deterred entry. 
Setting 6 equal to 0.35 may seem somewhat extreme. It may perhaps be rationalized 
as a reflection of concerns about unpredictable shocks adversely affecting profitability 
in period 2. To reflect the idea that protection can discourage the entry of low-cost 
firms, the entrant has lower marginal cost than the high-cost incumbent. This means if 
the entrant does enter it will gain a higher proportion of the collective duopoly profit 
than the high cost-incumbent. Therefore the high-cost incumbent behaving as if it was 
low-cost will only deter the entrant from entering if the entrant believes that the 
probability that the incumbent is not low-cost is very low. Hence p has been set very 
low so that the entrant will believe the expected profit from entry is negative if the
incumbent behaves as if it was low-cost.
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Now consider the following results associated with the high-cost incumbent operating 
as a monopolist:
Hx i
, ~  Ha - b.Q - Cj
2b
2.75




(a  - b.Q - c ,” )2 
4b
5.56 .
Now consider the following results associated with the low-cost incumbent operating 
as a monopolist:
Lx i
a - b.Q - CjL
2b
= 4






(a  - b.Q - cj")2 
4b
14 .
The profit associated with the high-cost incumbent behaving like the low-cost 
incumbent:
H(L) f  L H. L f  A
*1 =(Pl  - Cl )•*! - f= 4 .
The profit associated with the low-cost incumbent behaving like the high-cost
incumbent:
L(H) {  H U  H -  A .7Cj = (pj - Cj J.Xj - f -  12.44.
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a - b.Q - CjH X E
2b 2
a - b.Q - CjL X E
2b 2
a - b.Q - cE HXI
2b 2
a - b.Q - cE LXI
2b 2
(1) (The high-cost incum bent’s reaction function.)
(2) (The low -cost incum bent’s reaction function.)
(3) (The entrant’s reaction function if  the incum bent 
is high-cost.)
(4) (The entrant’s reaction function if the incum bent 
is low-cost.)
Hence the duopoly ou tpu ts, price and profits for the high-cost incum bent case are as
follows:














(a - b.Q - 2CjH + c£)^  
9b
0.78
(a - b.Q - 2 c£ + CjH)2H
* E  ‘ 9b
- f -  2.69 .
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(a  - b.Q - 2 CjL 
9b
9.11
(a - b.Q - 2 c E + CjV  
9b
- 0.22  .
Prior to going on to consider the game-theoretic equilibrium using a game tree 
it is necessary to check whether setting period 1 price equal to PjL=5 will deter the 
entrant from entering in the second period. The entrant’s decision making process is as 
follows:
(a) The entrant observes the first-period price.
(b) The entrant uses this information to assist with deciding upon the probability 
of the incumbent being high-cost (denoted p(pj)). If Pi>PiL then the incumbent 
must be high cost since it would be irrational for a low-cost incumbent to price 
above the profit-maximising level, hence p(p!)=l. However if pj<p,L the entrant 
cannot infer whether the incumbent is high-cost or low-cost and consequently 
must rely upon its prior beliefs, hence pC p^p.
(c) The entrant then uses pCp^ to calculate its expected profit in period 2 if it
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decided to enter. Clearly if the expected profit from entry is negative, entry will 
not take place.
So it is necessary to establish that the p(pt) which is consistent with E tce=0, denoted 
p(Pi)ett=0’ is greater than p for entry to be deterred. The entrant’s reaction function for 
maximising expected profit for this illustration can be written as;
6 - [ p (p ,) x ,H * (1 - p Cp , » ^ , 1]
x E ---------------------------------------------- . (5)
2
Using (5) and the respective reaction functions for the high-cost and low-cost 
incumbents, (1) and (2), we can write xE, x,H and XjL as functions of p(pj):
4 * 2 . 5 p ( Pl)
S'  3
H 6.25 - 1.25 p(Pj) 
3
L 10 - 1.25 n(p,)
This allows us to be able to write the expected post entry price and hence the expected 
post entry entrant’s profit as functions of pCp^:
EPD-
13 * 2 .5p (p ,) 
3
E j i e
(4  ♦ 2.5)1 (p ,))2 
9
By setting E tie=0 we can show p(pj)E7X=o-0.0971. Therefore since p=0.05 a high-cost 
incumbent can successfully deter entry by behaving like a low cost incumbent.
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Figure 7.7 shows the game set out in extensive form. At each terminal node the 
payoffs are shown for the incumbent and the entrant respectively. Each payoff consists 
of the sum of the first period profit and the discounted second period profit. The game 
tree is constructed with ‘Nature’ moving first choosing whether the incumbent is to be 
high-cost or low-cost. Next the incumbent needs to choose what price to charge in the 
first period. Clearly there are more than two possible prices which the incumbent may 
choose. However for expository purposes, the only prices shown are those which 
maximise period 1 profits for the respective types of incumbents. Following the choice 
of p, the entrant has to choose whether to enter in the second period. Since the entrant 
is unaware of Nature’s choice it does not know whether the payoff from entering will 
be -0.08 or 0.94. If the incumbent was to set pj=6.25 then the entrant would conclude 
that Nature had chosen ‘high-cost’. However if the incumbent was to set pp=5 then it 
is assumed that the entrant believes that there is only a probability of 0.05 that Nature 
has chosen ‘high-cost’ and so the expected payoff from entry is -0.03. Obviously a low- 
cost incumbent will set p,=5 since this will yield a higher payoff whatever the subsequent 
choice made by the entrant. A high-cost incumbent will also set pj=5 since it knows that 
the entrant’s reaction to this will be to choose not to enter and that the payoff from this 
entry-deterrence strategy of 5.95 will exceed the payoff from setting pj=6.25. If a high- 
cost incumbent was to set pf=6.25 it would maximise period 1 profits but lose its 
monopoly position in period 2 yielding a payoff of 5.83. Thus we have a pooling 
equilibrium since both types of incumbent choose pj=5 so that the incumbent’s true type 
is not revealed to the entrant9.
9. For a discussion of equilibrium concepts for games of incomplete information see Tirole 
(1988 C h.ll).
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Figure 7.7: A Pooling Equilibrium
p -  6.25
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Now consider the effect of decreasing protection by increasing Q from 0 to 0.5. 
Remaking the above calculations gives the following: 
x,H=2.5, p,H=6, tt/M .2 5 ;
XjL=3.75, pjL=4.75, 12.06;
n IH(L)“2.69, tciL(H)“  10.5;
xE =2, Xj^) =1.5, pDH=5, 7tEH=2, 7tI(D)H=0.25;
xEL“ 1.17, xI(D)L“3.17, pDL“4.17, 7tEL~-0.64, 7i1(D)L~8.03.
The associated payoffs are shown in Figure 7.8. As one would expect both the payoffs 
and the profit-maximising period 1 prices are lower when a comparison is made with 
Figure 7.7. The important thing to be noticed is that it no longer pays a high-cost 
incumbent to pretend to be a low-cost incumbent. Setting p,=4.75 sacrifices period 1 
profit so as to deter entry in period 2 and yields a payoff of 4.18. Setting p,=6 
maximises period 1 profit and reveals to the entrant that the incumbent is high-cost 
yielding a payoff of 4.34. Hence there is now a separating equilibrium; if the incumbent 
is high-cost p p ö  and if the incumbent is low-cost p,=4.75. The Milgrom and Roberts 
analysis considers a separating equilibrium which occurs because p is too high for 
pricing like a low-cost incumbent to deter entry. In the case shown here the high-cost 
incumbent could deter entry but chooses not to since there is a higher payoff from 
accommodating entry.
Lastly consider why a reduction in protection can cause a high-cost incumbent 
to turn from deterring entry to accommodating entry. In the numeric example the payoff 
from deterring entry decreases by 1.77 when protection is reduced. However the payoff 
from accommodating entry only decreases by 1.49. The reason for the difference is that
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if entry is accommodated, there will be a Cournot duopoly in period 2. It can be shown 
that increasing Q leads to a smaller reduction in the profits of a firm if it is a Cournot 
duopolist rather than a monopolist:
d n f  (a - b.Q - CjH) 
dQ 2
2 ( a " b Q - 2 ciH+ ce) 
dQ 9
„ H Hd n l  ^711(D)
dQ dQ
5a - 5b.Q - CjH - 4c£
18
It is simple to show that A must be positive for the high-cost incumbent to be in the 
industry in the first place:
5a - 5b.Q - CjH - 4c£ > 5(a - b.Q - CjH) since CjH > c£.
5( a-  b.Q - Cj“) > 0 if
a - b.Q - ctH
---------------------------- > 0 .
2b
To use Tirole’s (1988 ch.8) terminology this result is closely related to the concept of 
the ‘persistence of monopoly’. Essentially this is the idea that there will be a tendency 
for monopoly to persist since the incumbent monopolist has more to lose than the 
entrant to a duopoly has to gain. Here an increase in Q which reduces the market power 
of the domestic firm(s) causes a more substantial fall in profits for the domestic 
monopolist since there are greater profits to be lost. The greater competition associated 
with a duopoly is destructive of profits and a substantial proportion of duopoly profits
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go to the new entrant rather than the former incumbent.
IV: Concluding Comments
It is useful to begin this section with a list summarising the results contained 
within this chapter.
(i) With the Spence-Dixit type model an increase in a quota (a reduction in 
protection) will not facilitate entry if the entrant is a domestic firm.
(ii) However this model does show that a reduction in a tariff will facilitate entry 
if the entrant is a foreign firm.
(iii) With the Milgrom and Roberts type model an increase in a quota can 
facilitate entry by a domestic firm. A numerical illustration is used to show a 
case where an increase in a quota causes the incumbent to switch from deterring 
entry to accommodating entry.
Clearly there is a striking contrast between the results obtained using the Spence-Dixit 
type model and those obtained using the Milgrom and Roberts type model. It is only the 
Milgrom and Roberts type model which will show a reduction in protection facilitating 
entry when the entrant is a domestic firm. However the Spence-Dixit type model does 
show a reduction in protection facilitating entry when the entrant is a foreign firm. 
These comparative static results illustrate the substantially different nature of these two 
types of models.
It should of course be remembered that in many instances of the threat of entry 
there is no ‘deter’ option available to the incumbent. Both of the models considered 
here rely upon specific circumstances. For example an entrant maybe quite convinced
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that the incumbent is a high cost-type. However there is an extensive empirical literature 
which indicates that it is relatively common for incumbent firms to make an aggressive 
response to the threat of entry10.
Future work in this area could perhaps focus upon instances of protectionist 
programs which favour incumbent firms over potential new entrants. A political 
economy of protection model might be developed to indicate what circumstances such 
protectionist programs might arise from. Another possibility for future work arising 
from this chapter is to consider analytically why an incumbent firm may have higher 
costs than a firm that has newly entered the industry.
10. For a guide to this literature see Scherer and Ross (1990 ch.10).
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This thesis has considered a number of models analysing the effects of protection 
on firms’ performance. In particular, it has developed a number of new arguments why 
reductions in protection may yield a cold shower effect. The results of the thesis are 
summarised below.
In Chapter 3 a well known principal/agent framework is used to model the 
protected firm. To simplify the analysis, a subsidy is chosen as a protective instrument. 
The case which is concentrated upon is that where effort and output are below their full 
information levels. It is shown that an increase in the subsidy can result in a reduction 
in managerial effort. However this is only the case for some classes of cost functions. 
It is interesting to note that one class of cost function in which this result holds is that 
for which managerial effort only affects fixed costs. Probably the most important result 
from Chapter 3 is that we can identify a welfare effect associated with the subsidy, which 
is separate from the standard deadweight loss. This effect is labelled the ‘organisational 
cost of protection’ since it only exists because of the asymmetry of information within 
the organisational structure of the firm. If this effect is positive then it is an 
organisational benefit. A component of this effect is labelled the ‘X-inefficiency cost of 
protection’. This is the welfare effect associated with the change in effort caused by the 
change in information rent received by the manager. If managerial effort increases in 
response to a fall in the subsidy, and output and effort are below their full information 
levels, then an organisational welfare improvement will be driven by a decrease in the 
X-inefficiency cost of protection.
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Chapter 4 models a firm choosing whether to invest in a cost-reducing 
technology or not. The outcome of making such an investment is uncertain. If the good 
outcome occurs then the investment will have a positive return. If the bad outcome 
occurs the result will be bankruptcy. A condition is derived for the removal of 
protection to make it more likely that the investment is accepted. This ‘cold shower 
condition’ can be written as follows:
The difference between the utility from not investing when protected and the 
utility from not investing when not protected, 
exceeds
the expected value of the difference between the utility from the good outcome 
when protected and the utility from the good outcome when not protected. 
Generally in this chapter the creditor funding the investment is assumed not to know the 
expected return on the individual investment being considered. However it is shown 
with a numerical illustration that, if the creditor is aware of both the potential profit 
flows and the probabilities associated with the good and bad outcomes, the cold shower 
scenario can still occur. That is, the investment is rejected while the protection is in 
place but accepted with the removal of the protection. While the analysis, is initially 
conducted with the assumption that the world market for the product concerned is 
perfectly competitive, in the latter part of the chapter imperfect competition issues are 
considered with an oligopolistic version of the model. It is shown, in the case of 
Cournot competition, that a cold shower is more likely if a quota rather than a tariff is 
the protective instrument. It is also shown that a cold shower is more likely if the 
domestic firm is a Stackelberg leader rather than a Cournot competitor. The theme of
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Cournot market structure to consider a reduction in the number of foreign firms (an 
increase in the domestic firm’s market power). It is argued that it is likely that this will 
increase the likelihood of a cold shower occurring.
Chapter 5 uses a Nash bargaining model to examine the relationship between a 
domestic component supplier and the downstream domestic firm which uses the 
component. The removal of protection from the domestic component supplier is 
considered. This makes it more feasible for the downstream firm to turn toward foreign 
component suppliers. Hence the removal of protection from the component supplier 
strengthens the bargaining power of the downstream firm. The form of bargaining 
engaged in involves the supplier and the downstream firm bargaining over a schedule of 
component prices for a range of possible quality levels and then the downstream firm 
deciding upon the required quality and quantity of the component. For the actual 
bargaining, two frameworks are considered. If the parties bargain over a ‘basic price’ 
N and a ‘quality premium’ y then it can be shown that the removal of protection will 
result in a higher level of quality being agreed to if there are ‘economies of quality’. 
Economies of quality refer to a supplier technology which has decreasing marginal costs 
of quality with increased output. An illustration of such a technology is provided where 
capital is a joint-input being used both to fabricate the component in the required 
numbers and insure the components are of required quality. With this technology it is 
assumed that the marginal product of the quality inspectors is increased as more capital 
is employed. If it is the case that only y (the quality premium) is bargained over, then 
the removal of protection unambiguously results in an increase in quality. This is 
because y must decrease in order to reflect the improvement in the downstream firm’s 
bargaining position.
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Chapter 6 uses a Nash bargaining model to analyse the relationship between the 
protected firm and its unionized workforce. Initially the chapter considers the case 
where wages and effort (work practices) are bargained over with employment being 
unilaterally determined by the firm. It is shown that a change in an import quota does 
affect the effort level while a change in a tariff or a subsidy does not. A condition is 
derived for when an increase in the quota (a reduction in protection) will result in an 
increase in effort. This condition is consistent with an increase in union power resulting 
in reduced effort. The chapter also considers the case where wages and the 
labour/capital ratio are bargained over with employment being unilaterally determined 
by the firm. It is shown that an increase in the quota will cause a reduction in the 
labour/capital ratio. This is consistent with the idea that a decrease in protection will 
lead to fewer workers being required to operate given pieces of capital equipment.
Chapter 7 uses two distinctly separate frameworks to analyse how entry 
deterrence by a domestic incumbent firm is affected by a change in protection. Initially 
a Spence-Dixit type model is used. It is shown that, if the potential entrant is a domestic 
firm, then a decrease in a quota has the potential to shift the incumbent from a strategy 
of deterrence to accommodation. It is also shown that, if the potential entrant is a 
foreign firm, then a decrease in a tariff has the potential to shift the incumbent from a 
strategy of deterrence to accommodation. The second half of the chapter uses a 
Milgrom and Roberts type model Here a numerical illustration is used to show how an 
increase in a quota can shift the incumbent from a strategy of deterrence to 
accommodation.
One thing which can be noted from the above list of results is that many of them 
provide reasons why we should not be surprised to observe a reduction in protection
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being accompanied by improvements in technical efficiency within the protected 
industries1. The principal-agent analysis in Chapter 3 shows that with some technologies 
a reduction in protection will result in reduced managerial effort. Chapter 4 shows that, 
if a reduction in protection threatens the existence of a firm, then the owner/manager 
may respond to this by making a risky investment in a cost-reducing technology. In 
Chapter 6 it is shown that easing quantitative import restrictions can result in restrictive 
work practices being negotiated away. The Milgrom and Roberts type model used in 
Chapter 7 allows a case to be shown where a reduction in protection can facilitate the 
entry of a new low cost domestic firm causing the average cost of production across the 
domestic industry.
While there are substantial differences in the analytical approaches taken in this 
thesis there is the common theme of treating protection policy as exogenous. That is, 
it is considered how the performance of the protected firm is affected by a given change 
in protection. The analysis does not say why a policy maker may put protection in place 
or why it may be removed. The formation of policy goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However we can loosely talk about the policy context within which these analyses fit. 
It is easy to think of various historical examples of an overall change in a government’s 
attitude to whether protection is beneficial or not. In Chapter 2 the example of Chile is 
mentioned in the discussion of the empirical literature. Following the coup in the early 
1970s the military junta took a particularly antiprotectionist attitude. In Australia there 
is currently a mild antiprotectionist consensus among the major political parties2. The
1. In Chapter 2 it is shown that the empirical literature lends significant support to the hypothesis that 
protection induces technical inefficiency.
2. For an excellent discussion of the attitude of Australian policy makers to protection see Anderson and 
Gamaut (1987).
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origin of this Australian antiprotectionist consensus can be traced back to the 1960s 
when a disenchantment began to occur with respect to the arguments in favour of 
protection. At an intellectual level the infant industry argument was becoming 
increasingly threadbare. Leading authors such as Corden (1974) emphasised the second- 
best nature of this argument. For example, if an industry has difficulty establishing itself 
due to capital market failure, then the first-best policy response would involve measures 
to improve the functioning of the capital market. The unimpressive performance of 
manufacturing industries in the 1970s, particularly those industries with a long history 
of high levels of protection, left the image of a group of infants who would never grow- 
upJ. The advent of official calculations of Effective Rates of Protection emphasised the 
high levels of protection which had been received by such industries as textiles, clothing 
and footwear3 4. Aside from the infant industry argument, the other historic justification 
for Australian protectionism is the supposed redistribution of income toward real wages 
and the consequent incentive for workers to immigrate to Australia. This argument has 
now lost its relevance. Redistributing income from farm households to the real wages 
of those employed in the protected manufacturing sector hardly seems particularly 
equitable given that average farm household incomes tend to be relatively low. Also it 
is no longer seen as a national priority to increase Australia’s population with European 
immigration. It is interesting to note is that Anderson and Garnaut (1987, p i 15-116) 
conclude:
3. The Industries Assistance Commission Annual Report for 1978-79 (Chapter 1) describes how over 
the 1970s the highly protected manufacturing industries experienced poor growth and a loss of 
employment. Import penetration increased even in some cases where the level o f protection 
increased.
4. See Krause (1984, p290).
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it would seem that the climate of opinion among leaders as to the effect of 
protection on the public or national interest has been more important in 
determining the average level of protection and its changes over time than in 
determining the inter-industry dispersion of protection rates. Private vested 
interest groups, on the other hand, have affected mainly the levels of protection 
in individual industries,...”
As a final example of the attitude to protection changing it is useful to recall that the new 
Roosevelt administration reversed the substantial growth in U.S. protectionism which 
had occurred through the 1920s and into the early 1930s5. The Roosevelt administration 
realised that worldwide high levels of protection had led to a dramatic reduction in world 
trade and with this realization the U.S. was prepared to enter into trade liberalization on 
a bilateral basis6.
To finish, we can note that, while no new or novel policy prescriptions arise from 
this analysis, it does provide support for the argument that trade liberalization not only 
attains benefits from the conventional gains from trade but also tends to improve the 
performance of the previously protected industries. Clearly the analysis is only relevant 
to certain situations. Obviously there are many cases where the removal of protection 
will in no way enhance the performance of the formally protected firm. It also needs to 
be remembered that under certain conditions most of the models in this thesis will show 
a case where a decrease in protection will lead to a deteration in the technical efficiency 
of the firm. However given the empirical evidence in favour of cold showers occurring 
this consideration does not seem of overwhelming concern. It should, of course, be kept
5. See Ethier (1983, p222-223).
6. This is, of course, strategic behaviour by a large country. Such an issue has not been looked at in this 
thesis.
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in mind that a cold shower does not necessarily represent a benefit to society. However 
it is reassuring to recall from Chapter 3 that a case can be easily shown where an 
increase in managerial effort, in response to a reduction in protection, represents a 
benefit to society. Similarly, it is also reassuring to recall from Chapter 6 that a case can 
be shown where a work-practices concession by the union, in response to a reduction 
in protection, represents a benefit to society.
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